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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
SCOPE OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN
U.S. AND CHINESE COURTS
Jian Zhou†
Abstract: The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards has been praised as one of the most efficient and powerful
multilateral legal instruments in promoting international commercial arbitration. The
implementation of the Convention, however, depends heavily on the domestic legal
mechanisms of contracting states. By strategically adjusting its scope, local courts may
expand or limit the benefits of the Convention in a significant way. The comparison
between the practices of United States and Chinese courts present two extreme examples
of this scope issue. There is considerable room to improve the domestic implementation
of the Convention in both countries. Comparison of the two countries also reveals that
appropriate domestic judicial intervention on the scope of application is required in order
to secure the benefits offered by the Convention.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Arbitration has become a popular alternative dispute resolution
avenue, both domestically and globally. Arbitration is praised for its speed,
the autonomy it provides to parties, the arbitrators’ technical expertise, the
confidentiality of proceedings, and its relatively low cost.1 When the setting
for commercial dispute resolution is international, arbitration precludes the
uncertainty of procedures in foreign courts. This is especially attractive for
Western investors in commercial disputes involving developing countries of
different cultures and conflicting political ideologies, such as Communist
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1
See generally Welber Barral & Frederico Cardoso, Global Developments: The New Brazilian
Arbitration Act: A Firm Step Forward, 5 CROAT. ARBIT. Y.B. 81 (1998).
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China.2 Enforcing arbitral awards in a foreign country is also much more
practical than enforcing a court judgment due in large part due to the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (“New York Convention” or “Convention”).3
The New York Convention offers a powerful instrument for enforcing
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards among its 130 plus contracting
parties.4 It requires each contracting state to recognize and enforce arbitral
awards entered in the territory of another state, as well as those awards that a
contracting state considers non-domestic awards.5
It also requires
contracting states to recognize written arbitration agreements.6 To benefit
from the Convention, an arbitration proceeding must fall within the
Convention’s scope. Although the Convention’s drafters strove for an
unambiguous compromise among different legal systems, the
implementation of the Convention in domestic courts differs dramatically
from one country to another and, in some cases, from one court to another
within the same country.7
In recognizing and enforcing awards that fall under the scope of the
Convention, contracting states are required to apply the criteria set forth
therein.8 Unfortunately, as a result of compromises among nations, the
scope of the Convention is not clearly defined. Ambiguity of language in
the Convention, discrepancies in legal concepts, and judicial discretion give
2
See generally Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13 (2000) (discussing the legal cultural differences between East
Asian countries and the West, and introducing traditional Chinese legal culture).
3
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. As of January 2004, the New
York Convention had 136 contracting members, including all major economies in the world. A list of the
members is available at U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_
texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited June 1, 2006). For a historical background of the
New York Convention, see JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 20-22 (2003). Due to the lack of an effective multilateral
judicial assistance treaty, enforceability of a judgment in a foreign country is very limited. For example,
there is no binding international judicial assistance treaty that commonly applies to both China and the
United States. A judgment from a foreign court will be considered as factual evidence in evaluating the
entire case in a U.S. court if there is no binding judicial assistance agreement on judgment enforcement
between the foreign country and the United States.
4
A list of the members is available at U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 3.
5
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I.
6
Id. art. II.
7
See, e.g., Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983). To illustrate the
difficulty in reaching a uniform understanding of the Convention, the Bergesen court wrote: “The family
of nations has endlessly—some say since the Tower of Babel—sought to breach the barrier of language.”
Id. at 929; see also discussion infra Parts IV-V.
8
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).
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rise to complexity in the Convention’s coverage. Moreover, because it is
impossible to require universal procedural protections in different legal
systems, each contracting state must determine the implementation
procedures of the Convention within its jurisdiction. In order to understand
its application, one must put the Convention in the context of each
contracting state’s legal system.
Both China and the United States are members of the New York
Convention.9 However, because of differences in court systems, sources of
law, and legal methodology, the Convention’s application differs
dramatically between the two countries.
This article compares the effects of domestic court interventions on
the scope of the New York Convention, in both China and in the United
States. Most significantly, if a claim is not within the scope of the
Convention, the purported substantive benefits provided in the Convention
become meaningless to the claiming party. Local court interpretations are
therefore crucial to achieving the Convention’s goals. In general, China and
the United States both support the New York Convention. However, the two
countries stand apart in legal approach and analytical methodology in
implementing the New York Convention. Through case law, this article
uncovers the impact and consequences of local court intervention on the
scope of the Convention. This article also proposes appropriate approaches
that local courts in China and the United States should adopt.
Part II introduces the basic arbitration legal framework in both China
and the United States. Part III offers a theoretical analysis of the
Convention’s scope of application. Part IV closely examines leading cases
in the United States on the scope of application issues and criticizes the
inconsistencies of court practice. Part V focuses on leading Chinese case
studies regarding the Convention’s scope of application and its related
impact on foreign businesses in China. The Conclusion argues that
inappropriate court intervention on the application of the Convention
jeopardizes its goals, and offers suggestions for improvement to judiciaries
in both China and the United States.

9

The Convention became effective in the United States on December 29, 1970. 21 U.S.T. 2517.
See also DECISIONS ON CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, adopted by the 18th Meeting of the 6th Session of the Standing Committee
of the NPC on December 2, 1986.
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ARBITRATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

Both China and the United States are members of the New York
Convention. However, common membership does not necessarily guarantee
a unified application of the terms of the Convention. Domestic courts and
implementing laws play critical roles in enforcing arbitral awards under the
New York Convention. As a result, different approaches in interpreting the
Convention by different local courts may result in striking discrepancies in
legal consequences. An understanding of domestic legal sources and court
systems in the United States and China is essential to conducting a
comparative study on the application of the New York Convention in the two
countries.
A.

Features of the Arbitration Legal Framework in China

Chinese law treats international arbitration cases differently from
domestic ones. In general, parties to international arbitration cases have
more autonomy and greater freedom from government interference: judicial
review of international arbitration is limited to procedural issues, while
review of domestic arbitration looks at substantive issues. Moreover,
arbitration institutes in China are separated into international and domestic
bodies. Though the jurisdiction of domestic and international arbitration
commissions overlap, international arbitration institutes handle most
international arbitrations. Furthermore, Chinese arbitral institutes offer
different procedural rules for international arbitration and usually provide
participating parties in international arbitration cases with broader autonomy
than in domestic arbitration cases. Finally, the New York Convention is
ultimately implemented in China through a unitary court system that has less
judicial independence.
1.

The Chinese Court System

China has four levels of courts, corresponding to the central level and
the three local levels of government.10 Unlike the separate court systems
10
XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 128 (1982) (P.R.C.). The central people’s government in Beijing has
ultimate power over the entire country. It consists of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the
Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Below this, there are thirty-one
provincial governing bodies. Within these provincial jurisdictions, there are three major lower levels of
governance: municipal, county and district, and township. Each lower level is subordinate to the higher
level with authority covering the geographical area. The governmental structure at each level mirrors that
of the central government, except that the township level does not have a standing committee for the
people’s congresses. See id. ch. 5, Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments.
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under the federalist system in the United States, however, these several
levels of courts form a unitary system. The Supreme People’s Court has
highest authority.11 Beneath it, there are three levels of local courts: the high
people’s courts at the provincial level, the intermediate people’s courts at the
prefecture or major municipality levels, and the basic people’s courts at the
county or municipal district levels.12 Each court is organized by and
responsible to a people’s congress at the corresponding level.13 The
president of each court is elected by the people’s congress at that level, and
other judges are appointed by the standing committee of the people’s
congress.14 Unlike the independent operation of court systems in the United
States, a lower level court in China is subject to supervision from the higher
level courts of proper jurisdiction.15
This supervision is in addition to
appellate review, and a higher court may intervene in a lower court’s trial
proceedings. The Supreme People’s Court also has the authority and duty to
interpret laws, administer the judiciary of all levels, and perform quasilegislative activities.16
Within a Chinese court, judicial duties are usually divided into five
branches: criminal, administrative, economic, civil, and enforcement.17 In
order to meet special needs, several higher-level courts also have specialty
divisions, such as an intellectual property branch.18 Furthermore, case
assignments in a court are determined by how the disputes are classified.
For example, commercial arbitration disputes are classified as economic
cases and are usually handled by the economic division in a court.19 Unlike

11

Id. art. 127.
See Organic Law of the People’s Court of PRC, art. 18, 23, 26, adopted at the Second Session of
the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and amended by the Second Meeting of the Sixth
National People's Congress on September 2, 1983 (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG
44).
13
XIAN FA art. 128.
14
Organic Law of the People’s Court, supra note 12, art. 35. Some exceptions exist for intermediate
prefectural, provincial and municipal courts directly under the central government. Id.
15
XIAN FA art. 127.
16
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 283 (2002); see also
Organic Law of the People’s Court, supra note 12, arts. 30, 33.
17
Chinese national law provides that each court should have at least three functional branches,
namely, criminal, civil and economic branches. Intermediate or higher level courts have discretionary
power to set up “such other divisions as are deemed necessary.” The enforcement branch is not a division
adjudicating cases but it was offered status equivalent to the other branches. See Organic Law of the
People’s Court of PRC, supra note 12, arts. 24, 27, 31.
18
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL
201 (2003).
19
Economic cases are those involving a sector of the economy, such as machinery, consumer
products, and individual enterprise. Contractual disputes are assigned to the economic division, except for
real estate contracts. In general, the civil division handles disputes which involve individuals, family
12
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court practice in the United States, where the assigned judge or a bench of
judges decides cases independently, each Chinese court has a committee
which adjudicates major and complicated cases.20 This committee has final
authority, and its members, appointed by the people’s congress at the same
level, are selected from the senior judges of the court.21
Any level court may be a trial court in China. The nature and
importance of a case are considered in determining original jurisdiction.22
County or district level basic courts are courts of general original jurisdiction
for civil litigation, but there are many exceptions. For example, intermediate
courts have original jurisdiction over significant foreign-related cases, cases
that have “major impact” in their respective jurisdictions, and cases that are
designated by the Supreme People’s Court from time to time.23 The
Supreme People’s and High People’s Courts may also preside over the trial
in cases of major impact, and a higher level court always has discretionary
authority to remove a case from a lower court.24 The “major impact” criteria
in civil cases are usually the monetary amount in dispute, the potential
impact of the outcome, and the geographical coverage of the dispute.25
Intermediate and higher courts are also courts of appeal for decisions from
the immediate lower level courts in their jurisdiction.26 Unlike the legal
review function of an appellate court in the United States, an appellate court
in China also investigates and determines facts.27

relationships, or personal and family property (e.g., housing, labor disputes, inheritance, tort, defamation,
and divorce).
20
Organic Law of People’s Court, supra note 12, art. 11; see also PEERENBOOM, supra note 16, at
284.
21
The judicative committee consists of the president, the vice president, the chief judge for
divisions, and senior judges, appointed by the standing committee of the people’s congress at the
corresponding level. Organic Law of People’s Court, supra note 12, art. 11.
22
See Civil Procedure Law of PRC, art. 18-21, adopted on April 9, 1991 at the Fourth Session of the
Seventh National People's Congress (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 19) [hereinafter
1991 Civil Procedure Law].
23
Id. art. 19.
24
Id. art. 21.
25
See CHOW, supra note 18, at 205-08 (laying out the framework for the jurisdiction of Chinese
courts in both civil and criminal cases, and noting that all criminal cases involving foreigners are to be tried
in the first instance by an intermediate people’s court).
26
1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, arts. 147-159 (ch. 14, Second Instance Procedures).
27
See Lingyun Gao, Comment, What Makes a Lawyer in China? The Chinese Legal Education
System After China’s Entry into the WTO, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 197, 210 (discussing
generally Chinese court systems and pointing out differences in appellate procedures between the United
States and China).
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Arbitration Related Legal Sources in China
a.

International Treaties

According to Chinese rules on conflict of laws, international
conventions (or treaties) of which China is a member or a signatory apply in
Chinese courts directly.
In cases of conflict between international
conventions and Chinese domestic laws, international conventions or treaties
prevail.28 Thus, arbitration related conventions of which China is a member,
such as the New York Convention, apply to cases in Chinese courts directly
and prevail over any conflicting domestic laws.
b.

1994 Arbitration Law

The adoption of the 1994 Arbitration Law29 was a significant
milestone in Chinese legislative history. Though the main focus of the law
was to reorganize the domestic arbitration system, it impacted international
commercial arbitration in China as well.30 The seventh of its eight chapters
contains special provisions for foreign-related arbitration.31 The other
chapters also apply to foreign-related arbitration as long as they do not
conflict with these special provisions.32 The law does not, however, cover
foreign arbitration that is not administrated in Chinese territory.

28

If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China “contains provisions differing from
those in the laws of the People's Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply,
unless the provisions are ones on which the People's Republic of China has announced reservations.”
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 142, adopted at the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 37, Apr.
12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 1165); see also
Sheng Chang Wang, The Impact of New Contract on Arbitration, ARB. & L. NEWSL, June 1999, at 5 (in
Chinese).
29
Arbitration Law of PRC, adopted by ninth session of the Standing Committee of eighth NPC on
Aug. 31, 1994, effective on Sept. 1, 1995 (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 710)
[hereinafter 1994 Arbitration Law].
30
Before the 1994 Arbitration Law became effective, domestic arbitration bodies were mainly
administrative organs of the Chinese government, with commissions set up to govern different types of
disputes (such as the economic contract arbitration commission, labor dispute arbitration commission, and
the technology contact arbitration commission). By adopting the 1994 Arbitration Law, the Chinese
domestic system was unified, and relatively independent arbitration commissions were set up in more than
140 municipalities around the country. Newly established arbitration commissions have broad jurisdiction
over contractual or property disputes, except for labor and farming contract disputes. Katherine L. Lynch,
Chinese Law: The New Arbitration Law, 26 HONG KONG L.J. 104, 105.
31
1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, ch. 7, arts. 65-73.
32
Id. art. 65 (“Matters not covered by this chapter shall be handled according to other relevant
provisions of this law”).
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1991 Civil Procedure Law

Enacted in 1991, the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC is another
significant piece of arbitration-related legislation.33 It separates arbitral
awards into domestic, foreign-related, and foreign awards,34 with each
receiving a different standard of judicial review. For domestic awards,
courts may conduct a substantive review of evidentiary issues, application of
law, and corruption of arbitrators.35 However, foreign-related awards
entered by a Chinese arbitration tribunal invite only procedural review of
such matters as whether the arbitration process followed the procedural rules
and whether parties were given proper notice for hearings.36 The law also
requires that Chinese courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards in
accordance with the New York Convention.37 When an award is entered in a
foreign country that is not a member of the Convention, Chinese courts will
recognize and enforce the award according to the principle of reciprocity.38
The provisions setting the standards for judicial review of arbitration awards
are incorporated into the 1994 Arbitration Law by direct reference.39 It is
significant that a court’s ruling on a denial of a request for enforcing an
arbitral award is not eligible for appeal, while a ruling on the validity of an
arbitration agreement may be appealed.40
d.

State Council Administrative Regulations and Interpretations

The State Council, as the top level of the executive branch, has
constitutional authority to both enact administrative regulations and
implement laws.41 In addition, ministries and commissions under the State
Council have issued numerous implementation guidelines and administrative
interpretations of laws.42

33

1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22.
Id. arts. 217, 260, 269.
35
Id. art. 217.
36
Id. art. 260.
37
Id. art. 269.
38
Id.
39
1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, art. 63 (referring to article 217 of the 1991 Civil Procedure
Law as ground for denying enforcement of domestic arbitration awards); see also 1994 Arbitration Law,
supra note 29, art. 71(referring to article 260(1) of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law as ground for denying
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards).
40
1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, arts. 140(1)(b)(i), 140(2).
41
XIAN FA arts. 85, 89, 90.
42
The Chinese system of legal interpretation is unique. The Standing Committee of the NPC has
legislative interpretative power; the State Council has administrative interpretative power; and, the SPC has
judicial interpretative power. CHOW, supra note 18, at 168-71.
34
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By adopting administrative orders and interpretations, the State
Council has played a key role in the interpretation of the 1994 Arbitration
Law. During the transitional period when the domestic arbitration system
was being reorganized under the 1994 Law, the State Council issued several
administrative guidelines of significant impact.
They covered the
organizational structure of arbitration commissions, administrative
registration of the commissions, sample arbitration procedural rules, feecharging schedules, and gave detailed rules for a smooth transition of
operations of the old system into the new system.43
Additionally, the State Council aggressively intervened in a
jurisdictional dispute between the local arbitration commissions and the
foreign-related arbitration commissions.44 Prior to the adoption of the 1994
Arbitration Law, foreign-related arbitration institutes, namely China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and
China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC), enjoyed exclusive
jurisdiction over foreign-related cases.45 The 1994 law ambiguously
provides that “foreign-related arbitration commissions may be established by
the China International Chamber of Commerce.”46 The newly established
local arbitration commissions took the position that the law was not intended
to confer exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related cases to foreign-related
arbitration commissions, but rather that jurisdiction was meant to be
concurrent.47 When the debate heated up, the State Council, through its subagency, issued a notice that gave local arbitration commissions the
concurrent jurisdiction they desired.48 Many criticized the State Council for
43
See, e.g., Notice of Bureau of Administrative Affair of the State Council on Preparation Work for
Re-establishing Arbitration Institution and Establishing Chinese Arbitration Association, issued on Nov.
13, 1994 (designating seven municipalities as trial cities for establishing arbitration commissions under the
new law and providing guidelines for several organs under the State Council to work on regulations for
establishing arbitration institutions) (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal); see also Notice of
Bureau of Administrative Affair of the State Council on Further Efforts on Re-Establishing Arbitration
Institutes, issued May 26, 1995 (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal); see also Notice of Bureau
of Administrative Affair of the State Council on Publishing Plan for Re-Establishing Arbitration Institutes,
Registration Method for Arbitration Commissions, and Method on Fee Charging Standards for Arbitration
Institutes, issued July 28, 1995 (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
44
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and China Maritime
Arbitration Commission (CMAC) have been China’s primary international arbitration institutes since the
1950’s.
45
See infra, note 275 and accompanying text.
46
1994 Arbitration Law art. 66 (emphasis added).
47
Challengers argued that the law would have used “shall” instead of “may” if it intended to reserve
jurisdiction on foreign-related cases exclusively to foreign arbitration commission. ZHIDONG CHEN,
《 国际国国国国国》 [INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION] (in Chinese) 61 (Law Press, 1998).
48
See BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS, STATE COUNCIL, NOTICE ON SEVERAL PROBLEMS TO
BE CLARIFIED CONCERNING THE THOROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRC ARBITRATION LAW (June 8,
1996) (“[T]he main duties of the re-organized arbitration commissions shall be to accept domestic
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going beyond its authority and expanding local commissions’ jurisdiction in
conflict with the 1994 Arbitration Law.49
e.

Judicial Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and
Leading Cases of Higher Courts

Through the Organic Law of the People’s Courts, the National
People’s Congress delegated to the Supreme People’s Court the authority to
interpret laws and issue practical rules.50 A narrow view of judicial
interpretation in China is that it is limited to explanations, provisions, and
replies of the Supreme People's Court, that are adopted through a quasilawmaking procedure.51 A judicial interpretation will not be effective until
approved by the judicial committee of the Court and published in the
People’s Court Daily (renmin fayuan bao).52 Once adopted, a judicial
interpretation is a binding legal source to which all courts may cite as a legal
basis in their decisions or rulings.53 However, the Court’s judicial
interpretations cannot conflict with the laws of the National People’s
Congress or State Council regulations, nor are they binding upon either of
these two bodies.54
A broader concept of judicial interpretation is that it not only includes
decisions of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), but also some decisions
of the high people’s courts (“HPC”) and the intermediate people’s courts
(“IPC”). In theory, unlike the American common law system, Chinese
courts do not adopt the doctrine of stare decisis and precedents therefore do
not have binding authority in lower courts.55 In practice, however, the SPC
arbitration cases. Where the parties to a foreign-related arbitration case voluntarily select arbitration by a
reorganized arbitration commission, such commission may accept the case.”).
49
See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 47, at 61-64 (criticizing both the State Council’s inappropriate
expansion and the NPC drafter’s looseness with legislative language).
50
Organic Law of the People’s Courts, supra note 12, art. 33. According to the Chinese
Constitution, the Standing Committee of the NPC is the appropriate organ to interpret the Constitution and
laws. XIAN FA art. 67(1), (4).
51
SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT [SPC], VARIOUS PROVISIONS CONCERNING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
(June 23, 1997) (Chinese version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
52
Id. arts. 3, 8, 11.
53
Id. art. 4.
54
See Li fa fa [Legislation Law] art. 88(1)(a), (b) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 15 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ. 112 (P.R.C.). Chinese courts do not have the power of judicial review to overrule statutes or
regulations enacted by the NPC or the State Council. According to the Legislation Law, the Standing
Committee of the NPC is the appropriate body to review whether an administrative regulation conflicts
with the Constitution or national law. The State Council has the right to review administrative orders or
regulations entered by its sub-agencies.
55
See generally CHOW, supra note 18, at 169 (comparing U.S. and Chinese legal precedent and
interpretations).
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selects leading cases from its own decisions and decisions of lower courts,
and publishes them in its SPC Gazette and on its official website.56 Legal
principles and rules endorsed by the SPC through these published cases have
significant influence over courts nationwide. Lower courts are most likely
to follow these rules and principles since the failure to observe de facto
precedent may result in a future reversal from the higher courts. In fact,
many SPC formal judicial interpretations are largely restatements and
summaries of the rules and principles embodied in previously published
leading cases.57
The Supreme People’s Court has issued more than a dozen judicial
interpretations concerning international arbitration that offer either
clarifications to ambiguous legislative provisions or new rules for legal
issues not addressed by laws and regulations.58
The SPC’s legal
interpretations are also major sources of practice guidelines for the New
York Convention.59
Complementing the SPC, the HPCs and IPCs frequently present “legal
opinions” on issues that the SPC has not interpreted. Although these “legal
opinions” are not binding legal sources, lower courts in the jurisdiction of
the HPC or IPC usually follow them.60 In several instances, HPC’s and
IPC’s local implementation of “legal opinions” have offered valuable and
practical experience to the SPC, and some local “legal opinions” have been
ratified by the SPC in later judicial interpretations.61 Most recently, adopting
local HPC and IPC “legal opinions” on international arbitration, the SPC
published a proposed version of the Provisions on Handling Foreign-Related
Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated Abroad by People’s Courts (2003
SPC Provisions (draft)).62 The Provisions collectively incorporate the “legal
56

Supreme People’s Court website, http://www.court.gov.cn (last visited April 23, 2006).
Yuwu Liu, Arbitration Agreement: The Chinese Practice and Future Trends, 16-8 MEALEY’S
INTL. ARB. REP. 16 (2001).
58
See JOHN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA, app. 7, nos. 1-34 (2001) (containing “Selected Major
Judicial Interpretations of the NSC Concerning Arbitration” in English).
59
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, NOTICE CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON
THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (Apr. 10, 1997), reprinted in MO,
supra note 58, app. 7; SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, NOTICE CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN
RELATED ARBITRATION AND FOREIGN ARBITRATIONS (Aug. 28, 1995), reprinted in MO, supra note 58,
app. 7.
60
Lower courts will follow the legal opinions of the higher courts in the same jurisdiction. In
addition, higher courts have influence on the promotion of judges in lower courts.
61
For example, the Shanghai HPC, the Beijing HPC, and the Shenzhen IPC issued their respective
legal opinions on implementing arbitration-related issues, including such topics as the validity of arbitration
agreements, jurisdiction and venue of courts, interim measures and re-arbitration, and enforcement.
62
See Draft for Public Comment Version of SPC Provisions on Handling by People’s Court of
Foreign-Related Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated Abroad (《 最最最最国最关最最最国最关最涉最国国
57
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opinions” of the Shanghai HPC and the Beijing HPC, and is intended for
nationwide application upon finalization of the public comments and
review.63
f.

Other Laws and Regulations

Provisions related to arbitration are also seen in other legislation. For
example, the Contract Law of the PRC has several articles incidentally
stipulating arbitration related issues.64
B.

The United States Legal Arbitration System

The law in the United States does not clearly differentiate between
international and domestic arbitration. Arbitration disputes involving
foreign elements may be heard in both state and federal courts. In addition,
arbitration is regulated at both federal and state levels,65 and both federal and
state laws may be applicable to international arbitration cases. On the
application of the New York Convention, the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) contains a special implementation chapter with a broader scope
than that of the Convention.66 Moreover, FAA provisions govern the areas
not covered by the special implementation chapter. Furthermore, neither the
FAA nor the Convention excludes the application of state laws. As a result,
application of the New York Convention involves puzzling conflicts in
choice of law rules.
1.

Applicable Law: Federal Law v. State Law

Until the U.S. Congress enacted the FAA in 1925,67 state laws were
applicable to all arbitration cases in both federal and state courts.68 As
decided in Erie R. Co. v Tompkins, federal courts must apply both statutes
and common laws of the state in diversity cases, except in matters governed

及最国国国及及及及及规及(征征征见征)》 ) (published in PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, Dec. 31, 2003, at 1, 3) (on file
with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
63
Id. at 1. The public comment period ended on February 20, 2004.
64
Contract Law, art. 54, 128, 129, adopted by the Ninth NPC on Mar. 15, 1999 (P.R.C.).
65
See Sebastien Besson, The Utility of State Laws Regulating International Commercial Arbitration
and Their Compatibility with the FAA, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 211, 212 (2000) (noting that “like virtually
all fields of law in the United States,” arbitration is regulated at federal and state levels).
66
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
67
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), ch. 213, §§ 1-5, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (current version at 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2004)).
68
Besson, supra note 65, at 212.

JUNE 2006

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN U.S. AND CHINESE COURTS

415

by the United States Constitution or by federal statutes.69 Therefore, state
laws and federal statutes may concurrently apply to arbitration cases.
The FAA created federal substantive and procedural laws to be
enforced both in federal and state courts.70 The FAA was enacted under
authority of the Interstate Commerce Clause;71 federal courts, therefore, are
not bound to follow state law or state public policies in determining
arbitration cases arising from the FAA.72 Fully respecting the rule set forth
in Erie, the United States Supreme Court, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co. and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, held that the
FAA applies in diversity cases in federal courts “because Congress had so
intended.”73 In addition, Congress intended for the FAA to preempt state
law in certain areas. In those areas neither federal nor state courts may apply
state statutes in conflict with the FAA.74
However, preemption by the FAA is limited, and the scope of its
application has been controversial since the enactment of the FAA. Under
the supremacy clause of the Constitution, federal law supersedes conflicting
state laws.75 Usually, the criteria used to decide preemption are the intent of
Congress,76 and the general constitutional issue of whether state law

69

The U.S. Constitution recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states in
their legislative and judicial departments, and the federal courts should enforce controlling laws regardless
of their format in statute or in common law. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198
(1956); see also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). The Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution states “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
70
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating in dicta
that the FAA governs in “either state or federal court”); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16
(1984) (reaffirming that the FAA creates substantive federal law governing both federal and state courts);
Romnes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
71
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14-15 (defining the FAA’s reach expansively and as coinciding with
that of the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3)); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (giving detailed reasons why the FAA’s scope can be said to have
expanded along with Congress’ commerce power over the years).
72
See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 838 (distinguishing the application of Erie); see also Robert
Lawrence Co. v Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
73
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (characterizing the
FAA as federal substantive law enacted pursuant to Congress’ powers over interstate commerce and
admiralty and noting that “Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with
respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513
U.S. at 271.
74
See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 (holding that the FAA pre-empts state law and that state
courts cannot apply state statutes to invalidate arbitration agreements); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265.
75
Besson, supra note 65, at 220.
76
See Securities Indus. Ass’ns v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D. Mass. 1988) (“In confronting
a preemption claim, the 'sole task' of the court is to determine the intent of Congress.”) (quoting Mass.
Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1987)).
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undermines the goals and polices of the federal arbitration law.77 However,
the FAA neither contains any express preemptive provision nor clearly
reflects a congressional intent to cover all issues of arbitration.78 In addition,
the general constitutional principle requires the application of state law
unless it “undermine[s] the goals and policies” of the federal arbitration
law.79
In general, the scope of preemption may be divided into three major
categories: (1) the validity of the arbitration agreement; (2) the arbitrability
of the dispute; and (3) other aspects of the arbitral process.80 In the first
category, the Supreme Court held that federal law governing the validity of
arbitration agreements is binding on state courts.81 However, state law is not
preempted in this category. For example, the “saving clause” of § 2 of the
FAA provides that an arbitration clause may be invalidated “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”82
Since each state has the power to regulate contracts, including arbitration
agreements, state law will apply to determine the validity of the arbitration
agreement (or clause) on the same grounds that state law applies to other
contracts.83 Meanwhile, in applying state contract law to arbitration
agreements, a state court cannot treat arbitration agreements less favorably
than any other contract.84 The FAA makes a state policy unlawful if it places
arbitration clauses on unequal footing with other contracts. Such a policy
would be in direct contrast with the intent of Congress as expressed in the
language of the FAA.85 In addition, parties are free to choose the applicable
law for their arbitration because the FAA intends to enforce arbitration
agreements according to their own terms.86 It is clear that the FAA preempts

77
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); see
also Besson, supra note 65, at 220 (discussing the criteria).
78
See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (upholding application of state arbitration
law to arbitration provision in contract not covered by the FAA).
79
Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. 468.
80
Besson, supra note 65, at 221.
81
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
82
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
83
Besson, supra note 65, at 221.
84
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; see also Besson, supra note 65, at 221. But see First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (ambiguously stating, “Courts generally should apply
ordinary state-law principles governing contract formation in deciding whether” an agreement exists.).
85
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)
(citing authority that due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration when applying
general state law contract principles to interpretation of arbitration agreements).
86
See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2004) (providing that arbitration be “in accordance with the terms of the
agreement”); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 479 (holding that enforcement of state rules of
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state laws dictating the format of arbitration agreements because the writing
requirement provision in the FAA has exclusive application in both state and
federal courts.87
In the second category of arbitrability, § 2 of the FAA is of greatest
relevance,88 providing that any maritime transaction or contract involving
commerce is to be arbitrable.89 This amounts to “a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding
any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”90 The Supreme
Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital stated that the issue of
arbitrability must be addressed with a “healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.”91 Supported by decisions from courts of appeal, the
Supreme Court further concluded that the FAA had established the rule that
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration.92
Finally, as to the remaining aspects of the arbitral process, there are no
settled rules on whether federal law preempts state law.93 The state courts’
approach to the application of the FAA has been significantly different than
the approach taken by the federal courts.94 The Supreme Court has yet to
offer any guidance on applicable law issues, and the state courts are left with
wide discretion as long their decisions do not conflict with the FAA and
federal case law. Interestingly, a substantial number of state courts have
held that they are bound to apply the FAA.95 However, some state courts
arbitration chosen by parties in their agreements is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the
results differ completely from those obtained from application of the FAA).
87
See Besson, supra note 65, at 225 (citing Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 71 Cal.
App. 4th 646 (1999) (holding that 9 U.S.C. § 2 preempts California state law on formal arbitration
agreements)).
88
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that 9
U.S.C. § 2 governs arbitrability in both state and federal courts).
89
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
90
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24.
91
Id.
92
See id. at 25 (holding that such policy should apply “whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability”).
93
Besson, supra note 65, at 221.
94
See id. at 222-23 (detailing examples of state courts’ different approaches).
95
See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1325-7 (1985) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); McEntire v.
Monarch Feed Mills, 631 S.W.2d 307 (Ark. 1982); Keating v. Super. Ct., 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982),
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decline to apply the FAA, claiming that it created substantive law only
applicable in federal court.96
In a positive approach to unifying state and federal practice, over
twenty-five states have, since 1955, adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act
(“UAA”), the content of which largely parallels that of the FAA.97 In
responding to the increased importance of international commercial
arbitration, five states have enacted new laws on international arbitration by
adopting, with modifications, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration.98 Meanwhile, several states introduced new laws
favoring international arbitration, although they differ in approach from the
UNCITRAL Model Law.99
In summary, both federal and state law may apply to arbitration cases
in state and federal courts. As a general principal, state arbitration laws
apply to arbitration disputes except on issues that the Supreme Court has
clearly declared to be preempted by the FAA.
appeal dismissed in part and rev’d in part sub nom; Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Melamed,
405 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-Line Indus., 201 S.E.2d 452 (Ga.
1973); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1980); Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox
County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. App. Ct. 1975); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band
Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127 (Kan. App. 1982); Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d
729 (Ky. 1977); State ex rel. St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Donelson, 631 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Burke County Pub. School Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver P’ship, 279 S.E.2d 816 (N.C.1981); Episcopal
Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1977); Tenn. River Pulp & Paper Co. v. Eichleay Corp.,
637 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1982); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
Allison v. Medicab Int'l, 597 P.2d 380 (Wash.1979)).
96
Most state courts so ruled after Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402
(2d Cir. 1959). In Robert Lawrence, the court held that the body of law created under the U.S. Arbitration
Act is substantive in character, not procedural, and it encompasses questions of interpretation and
construction as well as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability. Such questions are to be
adjudicated by the federal courts whenever they have subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity
jurisdiction. Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Kress Corp. v.
Edward C. Levy Co., 430 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Thayer v. Am. Fin. Advisors, 322 N.W.2d 599
(Minn. 1982); Withers Busby Group v. Surety Indus., 538 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)).
97
Besson, supra note 65, at 212.
98
Besson so concluded in his 2000 article. Id. at 217. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and
Texas have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in some form. U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade
Law, Status: 1985-UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2006). In
1988 California enacted legislation entitled Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial
Disputes. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.432. In 1989, Connecticut enacted the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-100 to -136. Also in 1989,
Texas enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation of International Disputes Act. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE. ANN. §§ 172.001 - 172.175. In 1991, North Carolina enacted the International Commercial
Arbitration Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30 to 1-567.68. Also in 1997, Ohio enacted the International
Commercial Arbitration Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2712.01-.91, and Oregon enacted the International
Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-.558.
99
See Besson supra note 65, at 217 (noting that Florida, Hawaii, Georgia, Maryland, and Colorado
enacted laws regulating international arbitration, all of which strongly favor international arbitration).
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The Federal Arbitration Act

The Federal Arbitration Act contains three chapters: Chapter 1,
enacted in 1925, commonly referred to as the Domestic FAA, establishes the
rules for recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements and awards in
both domestic and international contexts;100 Chapter 2, enacted in 1970 and
commonly referred to as the Convention Act of the implementing legislation,
incorporates and implements the New York Convention;101 and, Chapter 3,
enacted in 1990, incorporates and implements the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (“Panama Convention
Act”).102
The Domestic FAA offers comprehensive enforcement procedures for
arbitration agreements and awards, and it applies to all arbitration cases.103
In fact, both the Convention Act and the Panama Convention Act clearly
provide that the Domestic FAA (Chapter 1 of FAA) applies to actions and
proceedings brought under the Convention Acts to the extent that “Chapter 1
is not in conflict with” the Convention Acts or the Conventions
themselves.104
The Convention Act, codified as Chapter 2 of FAA, was adopted to
implement the New York Convention. Although an original participating
member in the United Nations Conference that produced the 1958 New York
Convention, the United States did not accede to the New York Convention
until 1970.105 The U.S. delegation to the 1958 New York Convention
Conference recommended that the United States not accede because of the
conflict between the implementation of the Convention and the state antiarbitration laws, as well as the United States’ lack of a sufficient domestic
legal basis for accepting the Convention.106 The delegation suggested that
100

9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; see also Besson, supra note 65, at 19-20 (noting the use of the short titles,
Domestic FAA and Convention Act, for Chapters One and Two, respectively).
101
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2004).
102
See generally Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International
Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 25-43 (2002)
(discussing the relationship between the three chapters of the FAA and their short names); see also 9
U.S.C. § 301 (2004). The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama
Convention) was concluded on January 30, 1975. 1438 U.N.T.S. 245, O.A.S.T.S. 42 (entered into force
June 16, 1976). “The Panama Convention incorporates the FAA’s terms unless they are in conflict with the
Inter-American Convention's terms." Productos Mercantiles e Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge U.S.A., Inc., 23
F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 307 (Supp. IV 1992)). Further elaboration on the scope of the
Panama Convention is beyond the scope of this article.
103
Productos Mercantiles, 23 F.3d at 45.
104
9 U.S.C. §§ 208, 307.
105
New York Convention, supra note 3.
106
See Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1074-75 (citing Office

420

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 2

the Convention would override state anti-arbitration laws and would require
changes in state, and possibly federal, court procedural rules.107 With the
dramatic change of domestic attitudes toward the New York Convention in
the following decade,108 the Senate granted accession to the Convention in
1970, conditioned on the enactment of proper implementing legislation—
Chapter 2 of the FAA (the Convention Act).109 The Convention then became
effective in the United States on December 29, 1970.110
One of the major purposes of the United States' accession to the
convention was to “encourage the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitral awards” and to relieve the courts of heavy caseloads.111
In addition, it also offered parties an alternative method for resolving
disputes that was “speedier and less costly than litigation.”112 Furthermore,
the enforcement of the Convention through the FAA has provided American
businesses with “a widely used system to obtain domestic enforcement of
international commercial arbitration awards, subject only to minimal
standards of domestic judicial review.”113
Structurally, the New York Convention was incorporated into federal
law by the Convention Act which governs the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards in federal and state courts.114 The
Convention was published as a note following § 201 of the Convention
Act.115

Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Commercial Arbitration 2, 15
(1958)).
107
S. Exec. Rep. No. 90-10, at 1, 4.
108
See Besson, supra note 65, at 230-31 (noting that as U.S. courts became familiar with the
arbitration, American lawyers and the business community started to rally around the Convention in the
decade since its inception). The U.S. signals its efforts to unify private law activities by participating in
multinational negotiations. Id.
109
Congress caused the delay in United States' membership in the New York Convention by its
actions in enacting the implementing legislation. The Senate created the new chapter based on the
recommendations of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law. The new
chapter would eliminate confusion by allowing for a distinction between cases under the Domestic FAA
and those under the Convention. See Besson, supra note 65, at 31, n. 89 (citing S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 8-9;
John P. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735, 737 (1970 - 1971).
110
9 U.S.C. § 201.
111
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983); Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v.
Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981).
112
Id.
113
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World
Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 888 (1995).
114
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269-73 (1995); Indus. Risk Insurers v.
M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1490 (11th Cir. 1998).
115
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (codifying the eight articles of the Convention Act).
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As a result, the New York Convention does not apply directly in
federal or state courts in the United States. As provided in § 201 of the
Convention Act, the New York Convention is implemented through the
mechanism set out in the Convention Act.116 Article I of the New York
Convention stipulates that it applies to arbitral awards “made in the territory
of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought” and to awards “not considered as domestic awards in the
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”117 Section 202
of the Convention Act however, offers a different scope of application. The
Act provides that the Convention applies generally to any arbitration
agreement or award arising out of a commercial legal relationship
(excluding those that are entirely between U.S. citizens and do not involve
property abroad), seeking performance, enforcement, or having some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.118 It appears that the
scope of the Convention awards defined in the U.S. legislation is broader
than that provided in Article I of the Convention. The plain reading of § 202
of the Convention Act indicates that any foreign connection may bring an
award under the Convention.119 U.S. legislation, therefore, abandoned the
territory criteria set forth in the Convention and expanded the scope to
include many domestic awards.120
III.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
YORK CONVENTION

OF THE

SCOPE

OF

APPLICATION

OF THE

NEW

As a compromise between negotiating parties to the New York
Convention, the Convention applies both to awards entered in foreign
territories and to awards to contracting states that are not considered
domestic (non-domestic awards).121 The Convention does not further define
non-domestic awards and leaves each contracting state to interpret the
criteria. In addition, the Convention allows each contracting state to make a
reciprocity reservation and to apply the Convention to awards entered in
another contracting state.122 A review of the Convention negotiation history
reveals that the reciprocity reservation was not intended to exclude those
awards entered in the territory in which enforcement was sought. Differing
116
See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (providing that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in United States
courts in accordance with [Chapter 2 of the Convention Act]”).
117
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).
118
9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
119
9 U.S.C § 202.
120
Id.
121
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).
122
Id. art. I(3).
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interpretations of the reciprocity reservation in the courts, however, has
resulted in variable application of the Convention.123
A.

Foreign Awards vs. Non-Domestic Awards

Article I of the New York Convention provides that the Convention
applies to two types of arbitral awards in recognition and enforcement
proceedings: (1) those awards made in a state other than the one where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, or so-called
“foreign awards”; and (2) those awards that are not considered domestic in
the state where their recognition and enforcement are sought, or so-called
“non-domestic awards.”124 The first category is easily understood as it is
defined by a clear criterion: the location of the arbitral award. The second,
more controversial category refers to awards entered locally but for some
reason considered “international” by the contracting state.
The two types of arbitral awards in Article I were the product of
unforeseen compromises between civil law and common law countries.
However, they failed to achieve any of the originally intended goals. The
initial draft of the 1958 Convention stated that the Convention applied only
to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards made in a state other than the
one wherein recognition and enforcement were sought.125 Therefore, the
draft included only “foreign arbitral awards” as determined by territorial
criterion.
Civil law countries such as France, Italy, and West Germany strongly
objected to this scope of application.126 They maintained that nationality of
parties, subject of dispute, and rules of arbitral procedure were all factors
that should be taken into account when determining whether an award has a
substantial foreign connection.127 Technically, an arbitral award entered in a
foreign territory may or may not be a foreign award in civil law countries.
For example, applying French procedural law to an award entered in
Germany may render such an award domestic to France. Conversely, an
arbitration award entered locally may, under certain circumstances, be
considered foreign. For example, applying German procedural law to an
123

See infra note 147 and related text.
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).
125
Albert Jan van den Berg, When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York
Convention of 1958?, 6 PACE L. REV., 25, 33 (1985); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, Report of the Committee on the
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, U.N. Docs. E/2704 and E/AC.42/4/Rev.1, (Mar. 28, 1955).
126
G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS 1 (1958); see also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir.1983).
127
van den Berg, supra note 125, at 33-34.
124
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award entered in France may render such an award foreign to French courts.
Major civil law countries strongly objected to the single territory criterion in
the Convention draft. Consequently, eight European civil law countries
proposed an alternative provision stating that “the Convention applies to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards other than those considered
domestic in the country in which they are relied upon.”128 This was intended
to remove territory as a criterion in the determination of whether an award is
a foreign award.129 The real value of the proposed non-domestic criterion
was that civil law countries could avoid applying the Convention to some
foreign rendered awards because their national laws consider them domestic.
This can occur in situations such as when the procedural law governing the
arbitration is the domestic law of the enforcing country.130
Delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and
Guatemala, however, argued that such an amendment would create an
obstacle for common law countries that rely on the location of arbitration to
determine a foreign award.131 These common law countries pressed for the
territory criterion in the Convention. Additional countries also pointed out
that the non-domestic criterion created ambiguities in definition.132 As each
country has its own rules for determining non-domestic awards, one
signatory state would encounter difficulty in predicting which awards would
be considered non-domestic in another.133 Furthermore, the Colombian
delegate emphasized that it was essential for the Convention to include an
unequivocal criterion to ensure that each signatory state would “know
exactly what the other States were undertaking to do.”134
A Working Group of delegates from both civil law and common law
countries was assigned to select a unanimous criterion. The Working Group
proposed a version similar to that of Article I(1) of today’s Convention. At
the time, the Working Group had an understanding that civil law countries
could reserve the right to exclude “certain categories of arbitral awards from
128

Id. at 34.
The French delegate opined that “the draft—tended to attach an exaggerated importance to the
place where the award was rendered. Practice had shown that the place of pronouncement was often an
insignificant factor, and the prominence given to it in the draft tended to obscure the strictly private nature
of the arbitration operation.” Id. at 33.
130
To this end, Italian delegates observed that “[t]he mere fact that an award had been made in a
country other than that in which it was sought to be relied upon was not enough to make it a foreign award
from the point of view of the country of enforcement.” Id. at 33.
131
Id. at 34.
132
Turkey, El Salvador, Argentina, and Colombia shared the complaint. Id. at 35-36.
133
The Columbian delegate argued at length about the importance of certainty in determining the
scope of application of the Convention. Id. at 36-37.
134
Id.
129
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the application of the Convention.”135 Surprisingly, although the proposed
text was voted on and adopted unanimously,136 the proposed exclusion
reservation was omitted.
The territory criterion was wholeheartedly incorporated into the final,
combined criteria. Application of this criterion became absolute: all
arbitration awards entered in a foreign territory are foreign awards to which
the Convention shall apply.137 Meanwhile, the Convention also applies to
any awards that were entered in the enforcing state if the domestic law
considers the awards non-domestic.138 Inclusion of the non-domestic
criterion, however, kept civil law countries from achieving their main goal
of excluding certain awards that were entered in a foreign territory yet
deemed domestic by the municipal laws of the country where enforcement
was sought. Furthermore, the criterion imposed a treaty obligation on both
common law and civil law countries to apply the Convention to locally
rendered arbitral awards that the enforcing country does not consider
domestic.139 For example, German courts are compelled to apply the
Convention to locally entered awards administered under French procedural
laws. In the real world, however, these requirements are rather abstract and
amount “to little more than a hypothetical academic construct.”140
It became clear that the compromise in Article 1 was in favor of
common law countries having a territorial criterion.141 The Convention
always applied to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made
in another state. Because common law countries traditionally lacked a nondomestic concept, the Convention’s non-domestic criterion did not increase
any obligation on them.142 One scholar alleged that civil law countries “may
135
The Working Group submitted the final text of Article I “on the understanding that . . . the scope
of application of the Convention may be qualified by such provisions as the Conference may adopt,
enabling Contracting States to exclude certain categories of arbitral awards from the application of the
Convention.” ECOSOC, Report of Working Party No. 1 on Art. I, par. 1 and Art. II of the Draft
Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/ L.42 (June 2, 1958). Both Italian and German delegates proposed that
individual states be permitted to ratify the Convention with a reservation to the effect that they would not
apply it to certain awards rendered abroad but considered by them to be “domestic.”
136
van den Berg, supra note 125, at 38.
137
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(3).
138
See Mark B. Feldman, An Award Made in New York Can Be a Foreign Arbitral Award, 39 ARB. J.
14, 17 (1984)
139
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that the non-domestic
criterion was desired by some countries “to preclude the enforcement of certain awards rendered abroad,
not to enhance enforcement of awards rendered domestically”).
140
See Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213,
223 (1996).
141
van den Berg, supra note 125, at 39.
142
For example, Chapter II of the FAA in the U.S. broke with common law tradition. See 9 U.S.C. §
202 (2004).
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well have been sandbagged” in the final version of the Convention.143
Ironically, years later, the United States, a traditionally common law country
without any non-domestic award concept, aggressively advocated
recognizing non-domestic awards in the context of applying the
Convention.144
B.

Reciprocity Reservation

Paragraph 3 of Article I of the Convention offers, inter alia, a
reservation option to contracting states that allows them, on the basis of
reciprocity, to limit the Convention’s application in awards recognition and
enforcement proceedings to those awards made “in the territory of another
Contracting State.”145 More than half of the 134 contracting states of the
Convention declared the “reciprocity reservation” at the time of accession to
the Convention.146 The language, “on the basis of the reciprocity,” indicates
that the purpose of the reservation is to allow a contracting state to limit
Convention benefits to the group of contracting states. The reservation is
applicable to the entire Convention, rather than just any isolated article.147
The ambiguity in the phrase, however, has led courts in certain contracting
states to adopt an entirely different interpretation. These states have
understood the reservation to limit the application of the Convention to
awards made “in the territory of another Contracting State,”148 rather than
awards made within the contracting state where recognition and enforcement
were sought.149 In this light, the “Reciprocity Reservation” allows a
contracting state to preclude the Convention from applying to those awards
that are entered locally yet considered non-domestic by municipal law.
The latter interpretation is neither logical nor supported by legislative
history. The New York Convention was made to replace the Geneva
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, a 1927 treaty
insufficient in fulfilling the purposes of recognition and enforcement of
143

Rau, supra note 140, at 223.
See Bergesen, 710 F.2d 928; see also infra Part IV.B.
See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(3) (stating that it is “[w]hen signing, ratifying or
acceding to this Convention[,] . . . any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply
the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State”). Another reservation option is offered for limiting the application of the Convention to
commercial arbitration. See id.
146
As of July 14, 2004, approximately 70 contracting states out of a total of 135 had declared the
reciprocity reservation. See U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law website, Status of Text,
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited May 7, 2004).
147
See New York Convention, supra note 3, art I(3).
148
Id. (emphasis added); see also Lander Co. v. MMP Inv., 927 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
149
Rau, supra note 140, at 225.
144
145
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foreign arbitral awards.150 The Geneva Convention provided a reciprocity
principle, not a reservation, that an arbitral award must be enforced if the
“said award has been made in a territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties” and “between persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of
the High Contracting Parties.”151 The New York Convention was believed to
further advance this by expanding its application to all foreign and nondomestic awards regardless of whether they were entered in a contracting
state.152 The Convention included the “reciprocity reservation” to address
certain countries’ unwillingness to extend their obligation to those noncontracting states that do not enforce awards from contracting states.153
Legislative history revealed that the “reciprocity reservation” was offered as
an option to limit the application of the Convention to foreign awards
entered in non-contracting states. This “if they won’t enforce our awards,
we won’t enforce theirs” understanding has been generally accepted as the
reason for the adoption of the “reciprocity reservation” under the
Convention.154
The major advocates for the non-domestic criterion (Germany, France,
the Netherlands, and Belgium) all declared the “reciprocity reservation” in
their accession to the New York Convention.155 These civil law countries
had aggressively advocated making the non-domestic criterion the only rule
for the Convention.156 Therefore, it would seem implausible that these
countries would declare a reservation to avoid applying the Convention to
non-domestic awards. Their declaration, therefore, can only be explained by
their intent to limit Convention treatment to member countries.

150

Id. at 226.
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92 L.N.T.S. 301, art. 1 (1927),
reprinted in W.M. REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND
NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 36
(1997) (emphases added).
152
Rau, supra note 140, at 226-28.
153
Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. E/2822, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION :
NEW YORK CONVENTION, at III.A.2.36-37, III.A.2.54 (Giorgio Gaja ed., 1985) (Netherlands); id. at
III.A.2.39 (United Kingdom); id. at III.A.2.49-51 (Yugoslavia).
154
Rau, supra note 140, at 226-27.
155
U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
NYConvention_status.html (last visited June 1, 2006).
156
See U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.3, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
NEW YORK CONVENTION, supra note 153, at III C.4.
151
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Definition of Non-Domestic Awards

The Convention concluded with an inclusion of the non-domestic
criterion but without a definition of “non-domestic awards.” Standards for
determining the non-domestic awards vary from one country to another.
Among them, European civil law scholars hold a prevailing theory that
whether an award is non-domestic is determined by the applicable
arbitration law.157 Under this theory, a locally entered award is considered
non-domestic if, as a result of the parties’ choice of law, it is governed by the
arbitration law of another country.158 Advocates of the theory rely on the
following reasoning to support their position. First, the legislative history of
the New York Convention indicates that a non-domestic award is primarily
determined by the applicable arbitration law.159 Second, implementation
legislation for the New York Convention in civil law countries, such as
Germany, has confirmed this method.160 Third, Convention text, such as that
in Article V, indicates that non-domestic awards are those entered locally
under the law of another state.161 Therefore, as a leading European scholar
claims, the appropriate conventional interpretation should be that “the
arbitration procedural law determines non-domestic awards.”162
Even so, the language of the Convention does not limit non-domestic
awards to those entered locally under foreign procedural laws. Instead, the
Convention offers each contracting state the authority to define nondomestic awards. The second sentence of Article I(1) of the Convention
reads, “[The Convention] shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered
as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are
sought”163 (emphases added). Therefore, to properly determine whether an
award is non-domestic, one must look to the municipal law of the state
where recognition and enforcement are sought. The language plainly
implies that the Convention allows variations in the non-domestic definition

157

van den Berg, supra note 125, at 42-43.
Id. at 43
159
For records of the participating delegates’ discussions and statements on the non-domestic
criterion issue, please see documents for the Conference reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION, supra note 153, at III.
160
See van den Berg, supra note 125, at 42-43 (pointing out that German law would consider a local
award entered under foreign procedural law a non-domestic award, and the New York Convention would
apply to such an award in Germany).
161
See id. at 43 (claiming that Article V of the New York Convention indicates the applicable law
chosen by parties is foreign law and different from the law of the country where the award was made); see
also New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V.
162
van den Berg, supra note 125, at 43.
163
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).
158
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across different countries. As a result of this flexibility in interpretation,
controversies have broken out in courtrooms around the world.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN THE U.S. COURTS

A.

The Convention Act and the Convention

The United States has been a member of the New York Convention
since 1970.164 The provisions of the Convention, however, do not apply
directly to the U.S. courts, but rather through domestic legislation—the
Convention Act.165 Adopted as a condition during accession to the
Convention, the Convention Act was meant not only to implement the
Convention provisions in U.S. Courts, but also to incorporate domestic
substantive and procedural rules for enforcing the Convention.166
The scope of application of the New York Convention, set forth in the
Convention Act, takes a different approach from Article I(1) of the New
York Convention. The Convention Act adopted neither the territory nor the
non-domestic criterion.167 Instead, Section 202 of the act assumed a broader
scope that applies the Convention to all commercial arbitration awards and
agreements except those arising from an exclusive legal relationship among
citizens of the United States without reasonable relations to a foreign
state.168
By merging their implementing legislation with the Convention, the
U.S. courts apply the Convention to two major categories: (1) arbitration
awards entered in a foreign territory except those falling within the
“reciprocity reservation”;169 and, (2) all arbitration awards entered in the
United States, except for those between two United States citizens without
any foreign connection. Little problem has existed when applying the

164

The Convention became effective in the United States on December 29, 1970. The United States
was an original participating member in the United Nations’ Conference that produced the 1958 New York
Convention. Upon the conclusion of the New York Convention in 1958, the U.S. delegation to the
Conference recommended the United States not accede to the Convention. The delegation’s concerns were
that implementation of the Convention would conflict with state anti-arbitration laws, and the United States
lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis for accepting the Convention. See Quigley, supra note 106, at
1074-75.
165
9 U.S.C. § 201 (the Convention Act became Part II of the FAA, §§ 201-208).
166
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
167
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I; see 9 U.S.C. § 202.
168
9 U.S.C. § 202.
169
When consenting to adoption of the Convention, the U.S. Senate declared, “The United States of
America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only
those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State.” 21 U.S.T. 2517.
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Convention to awards in the first category.170 Application to awards in the
second category, on the other hand, has sparked controversial debate both
within U.S. courtrooms and among international commentators.
It appears that the qualified Convention awards, as defined in the U.S.
legislation, are broader than those defined in Article I of the Convention. A
basic reading of Section 202 of the Convention Act indicates that any
foreign involvement may bring an award under the Convention.171 The
scope of application of the New York Convention is specifically and clearly
defined. Unsurprisingly, the expansion of the scope in the Convention Act
brought an onslaught of criticism.172
For an arbitration agreement, on the other hand, § 202 imposes a
“somewhat more restrictive” requirement on the application of the
Convention.173 Article II of the Convention simply requires “each
Contracting State” to recognize an arbitration agreement in writing without
restricting it to foreign-related or international agreements.174 However,
Section 202 excludes arbitration agreements made solely between two U.S.
citizens who have no foreign connections.175 Furthermore, the Convention
Act authorizes original jurisdiction in federal courts over actions and
proceedings arising under the Convention.176
B.

Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.: The First Attempt to Define NonDomestic Awards

1.

The Bergesen Decision

No U.S. court addressed in detail the non-domestic concept or the
scope of application of the Convention until the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decision in Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. in 1983.177 The widely
170
But see Jones v. Sea Tow Services, 30 F.3d 360, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1994) (challenging the territory
criterion); discussion infra Part IV.D.
171
See 9 U.S.C. § 202.
172
See discussion infra Part IV.
173
McMahon, supra note 109, at 739.
174
21 U.S.T. 2517, art. II(1).
175
9 U.S.C. § 202 (2004) (corporations are U.S. citizens if they are incorporated or have their
principal places of business in the U.S.).
176
See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (providing federal courts with original jurisdiction regardless of the amount in
controversy).
177
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). In various instances, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and other district courts in that circuit have touched on the issue of
application of the Convention to locally entered awards, but none of them has fully discussed the issue.
See, e.g., Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting
the issue of application of the Convention to local arbitration awards was “intriguing,” but did not need to
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cited Bergesen case involved a dispute between a Norwegian ship owner,
Bergesen, and a Swiss company, Joseph Muller Corp., which arose from
issues of performance of international transportation contracts. The dispute
was arbitrated in New York City according to the arbitration clauses
contained in the contracts, and the arbitral award was entered in favor of
Bergesen.178 After Bergesen tried unsuccessfully to enforce the award in
Switzerland, he petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York to confirm the arbitration award. The district court
confirmed the award, holding that the Convention applied to an award
rendered in the United States involving foreign interests. Joseph Muller
Corp. appealed, and the circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision
with elaborate analyses of the non-domestic concept and the scope of the
Convention’s application.179
In determining the issue of what qualifies for a non-domestic award
under the Convention, the court declared that the definition of a nondomestic award “appears to have been left out deliberately in order to cover
as wide a variety of eligible awards as possible, while permitting the
enforcing authority to supply its own definition of ‘non-domestic’ in
conformity with its own national law.”180 Furthermore, the court decided
that a non-domestic award is an award “made within the legal framework of
another country.” The Court gave two examples that fall within the
definition: (1) those awards made in accordance with a foreign law; and, (2)
those awards involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of
business outside the enforcement jurisdiction.181 The Court reasoned that
this broader construction was preferred because “it [was] more in line with
the intended purpose” of the Convention: to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitration awards.182
Muller argued that the “reciprocity reservation” adopted by the United
States should be considered, and that the Convention should be interpreted
narrowly.183 The district court did not adopt Muller’s argument; rather, it
held that the treaty language “should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its
be decided in the case since the application of the Domestic FAA sufficiently resolved the issue); see also,
Transmarine Seaways Corp. v. Marc Rich & Co. A. G., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (holding that §
202 of the Convention applied to the award entered in New York City since the two parties were foreign
companies).
178
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 928.
179
Id. at 929-30.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 932.
182
See id. at 932 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) in supporting the policy
argument).
183
Id.
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recognition and enforcement purpose.”184 The circuit court failed, however,
to elaborate the reciprocity reservation.185
The court further examined the issue of whether § 202 of the
Convention Act covered the disputed award. After reviewing the legislative
history, the court dictated that § 202 was intended to ensure the enforcement
of arbitral awards with reasonable foreign relationships.186 The court further
concluded that in enacting § 202, Congress did not desire to exclude
application of the New York Convention to an arbitral award entered in the
United States between two foreign parties.187
2.

Criticisms of the Bergesen Decision

The Bergesen decision profoundly influenced “non-domestic awards”
in U.S. courts.188 Thus far, the Second Circuit has followed the decision in
jurisdictions where Bergesen is binding legal authority. In several other
circuits, Bergesen is also considered influential authority.189
Not
surprisingly, the Bergesen decision triggered complex responses in the
United States and other countries. American commentators generally
believed that the broader application of the Convention, as set forth in
Bergesen, was a positive approach that would promote U.S. cities as seats of
international commercial arbitration.190 The decision was also praised for
promoting the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by encouraging
184

Id. at 933.
Id.
186
See id. (citing legislative history at H.R. Rep. No. 91-1181 (1970), as reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602).
187
See id. The court stated that if Congress had desired to exclude arbitral awards rendered in the
United States and involving foreign parties, it would have done so. It also analyzed other sections to
support its conclusion. The Court noted that § 203 had been held to provide jurisdiction for disputes
involving two noncitizens, and that § 206 had been interpreted as applying to arbitration occurring in places
“within or without the United States.” See id.
188
Bergesen has been cited in fifty-five cases in U.S. district courts and circuit courts of appeal in the
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits, and has been cited forty-nine times in law review articles.
Shepard’s Summary at LexisNexis, Bergesen, 710 F.2d 928.
189
As of May 2004, seven cases followed Bergesen’s rule. Productos Mercantiles e Industriales, S.A.
v. Faberge U.S.A., 23 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1994); Dworkin-Cosell Interair Courier Servs., Inc. v. Avraham, 728
F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Trans Chem., Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F.
Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 744
(W.D. Mich. 2003); Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997); Lloyd's, London v. Argonaut
Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
190
See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 138, at 16 (claiming that the Bergesen decision has “strengthened
New York City’s potential to become a major center of international commercial arbitration”); see also
William Phillips, Case Comment, Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Second Circuit Provides a
Hospitable Forum, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 489 (1984); Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 629, 643-44 (1989) (referring to Bergesen as an “enlightened example” applauded by most because it
“properly recognizes the need to provide the broadest possible recognition to arbitral awards”).
185
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arbitrations as an alternative to litigation, and for enabling American
businessmen to demand enforcement under the Convention in a foreign
country when U.S. law was chosen as the applicable law for the
arbitration.191
European commentators criticized the Bergesen decision however, for
reaching beyond the boundaries of the Convention, and argued that such an
approach threatened the implementation of the Convention.192 Their
challenges were based on the legislative history of both the Convention and
the U.S. Convention Act. Commentators have also claimed that the
legislative history of the Convention indicates that non-domestic awards are
those entered in arbitrations governed by foreign law,193 and that the
nationality of the parties does not impact the scope of the application of the
Convention.194 In addition, critics claim that the legislative history of the
U.S. Convention Act reveals that the drafters did not intend the Convention
to include locally rendered awards between two foreign parties.195
The real concern of the critics was that application of the Convention
to locally entered awards involving two foreign parties would make U.S.
enforcement of the awards more cumbersome. First, the enforcement of
such awards might be subject to challenges from a losing party under both
the Domestic FAA and the Convention.196 Second, application of the
Convention could impose a higher standard for written agreements than the
lesser requirements in the U.S. Domestic FAA.197 Finally, the expansive
interpretation would make it more difficult for foreign courts to determine

191
Susan P. Brown, Recent Development, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards—The United
Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 217, 230-33 (1984). The claim was based on the observation that the legal regime applicable to
domestic arbitration in many contracting states to the New York Convention is significantly less liberal
than the regime applicable to the enforcement under the Convention. Feldman, supra note 138, at 18.
192
The most serious challenge was from Dr. Albert Jan van den Berg, Secretary of Netherlands
Arbitration Institute and General Editor for Year Book Commercial Arbitration. See van den Berg, supra
note 125; see also Filip de Ly, The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International
Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 48, 77 (1991). de
Ly, an Associate Professor at University of Urecht, criticized Bergesen as a case inspired by U.S. law and
one which may pose a threat to the New York Convention-based system, characterized by judicial review
of the award in the home country and by relatively limited control in the enforcing country. Id.
193
van den Berg, supra note 125, at 43.
194
Id. at 47.
195
Id. at 50.
196
A losing party may defend itself in recognition and enforcement proceedings according to the
Convention Act and the Convention. In addition, a losing party may petition to set aside the award under
either Chapter I of the Domestic FAA, or state arbitration law. Id. at 55.
197
The New York Convention requires a more stringent written form than do the Domestic FAA or
the arbitration laws of most U.S. states. Id. at 56; see also New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II(2).
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the applicability of the Convention to an award that was entered through
application of the New York law.198
European commentators admitted, however, that the Bergesen
decision “makes the United States a more hospitable forum for foreign
parties intending to arbitrate within the United States.199 Applying the
Convention to an award between two foreign parties grants federal
jurisdiction to U.S. courts in enforcing the award which they would not
otherwise have due to a lack of the required diversity elements.200
Overall, the benefits of the Bergesen rule outweigh its shortcomings.
When a party appropriately cites the Convention as a basis for the
enforcement of an award, the Convention becomes an independent basis for
enforcement and a losing party cannot challenge it based on the domestic
FAA. Moreover, a foreign court’s difficulty in predicting U.S. law is an
occasional occurrence and is outweighed by the benefits obtained by the
high volume of non-domestic awards enforced in the United States.
Furthermore, the written format required by the Convention is generally not
an issue in such a highly commercialized business world.
C.

Lander Co. v. MMP Investments: “Reciprocity Reservation” Clarified

1.

Unresolved Issues in Bergesen and the Facts of Lander

While Bergesen only represents an initial attempt to expand the
application of the Convention in U.S. Courts, Lander Co. v. MMP
Investments is a leading case in defining non-domestic awards in the United
States.201 The Bergesen Court used a specific factor, the nationalities of the
parties, as a basis for claiming that the award was made within the legal
framework of another country.202 However, the court neither addressed the
relationship between the Convention Act and the Convention, nor did it

198
The critics presented the case of a German court asked to enforce an award between Swiss and
German parties by applying the New York law. The German court was uncertain whether the New York
law expanded the application of the Convention. van den Berg, supra note 125, at 57.
199
Id. at 50.
200
Chapter One of the FAA (the Domestic FAA) does not create independent jurisdiction. Two
foreign parties are not qualified for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question
jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. §1331 (diversity jurisdiction).
201
Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 927 F. Supp. 1078 (N. D. Ill. 1996) (Lander I); Lander Co. v. MMP
Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997) (Lander II).
202
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
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clarify whether the “reciprocity reservation” impacts “non-domestic”
awards.203 Such issues were first examined and clarified in Lander.
The facts of Lander are not complicated. In February 1993, Lander
Co., a New Jersey company, and MMP Investment, an Illinois company,
entered into two contracts for Lander’s shampoo and other products to be
distributed by MMP Investment in Poland.204 The contracts provided that
any disputes would be settled by binding arbitration pursuant to the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
(“ICC”). The contracts further stipulated that the arbitration would be
conducted in New York City and the agreement would be construed in
accordance with New York state law.205 When both parties’ performance fell
short, MMP Investment initiated an arbitration proceeding. The arbitration
was structured in accordance with the ICC Rules in New York City and an
award was entered in favor of Lander in October 1995.206 Lander petitioned
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to confirm the
arbitration award under the Convention. Though Lander alleged that there
was federal jurisdiction under the FAA, the Convention Act and on the basis
of diversity, the district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.207
The appellate court however, reversed the decision and elaborated on several
previously unresolved issues pertinent to non-domestic awards.208
2.

Reciprocity Reservation

The Bergesen court deferred ruling on whether the United States’
reciprocity reservation limits the recognition of non-domestic awards.209 In
Lander, the district court offered a bold but unsupported interpretation of the
reciprocity reservation. Without examining its context and legislative
history, the district court jumped to a conclusion that the reciprocity
reservation, by its express terms, limits “the enforcement and recognition of
arbitral awards on a territorial basis, to those made in a country other than
the United States.”210
203

See Bergesen, 710 F. 2d at 932-33 (responding to the argument that the court should interpret the
Convention narrowly based on the reciprocity reservation the U.S. adopted, the court did not address
whether the reciprocity reservation prevents the Convention from applying to awards entered in the United
States).
204
Lander II, 107 F.3d at 478.
205
Id.
206
Lander I, 927 F. Supp. at 1079.
207
Id. at 1078, 1081-82.
208
Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482.
209
See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-33 (stating vaguely that the treaty language should be interpreted
broadly on the issue of reciprocity reservation).
210
Lander I, 927 F. Supp. at 1081-82 (emphasis added).
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The district court, citing Bergesen, further stated that the definition of
non-domestic awards in § 202 of the U.S. Convention Act did not affect the
court’s interpretation.211 The court viewed § 202 as a limitation created by
Congress to exclude awards entered in foreign territories between two U.S.
parties without any other foreign connection.212 The court concluded that
because the “reciprocity reservation” made by the United States “effectively
negates the non-domestic award option of Article I(1)” of the Convention,
there would have been no need for the U.S. Convention Act to define nondomestic awards.213
The appellate court reversed in whole the lower court’s decision
concerning the impact of the “reciprocity reservation” on non-domestic
awards.214 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
“reciprocity reservation” declaration should be understood to mean that the
United States would only enforce arbitral awards made by contracting
parties that adhere to the Convention.215 Creatively, the court stated that the
reservation was intended to limit the United States to applying the
Convention to arbitral awards made in the territory of “another signatory of
the Convention, like the United States, as opposed to non-signatories.”216
Such a liberal interpretation has generally been accepted in academia and by
U.S. federal courts.217
3.

Overlap Between the Convention and the Convention Act

In Lander, the appellate court went further than Bergesen by
analyzing the relationship between the Convention and § 202 of the
Convention Act.
It determined that § 202 was broader than the
Convention218 and that a broader application of the New York Convention
under § 202 was valid because Congress has appropriate commerce power to
expand § 202 beyond the Convention.219

211

Id. at 1081.
See id. at 1081 (asserting that the language of § 202 is “cast in terms of exclusion rather than
inclusion”).
213
Id. (citing van den Berg’s article, the court asserted that if Congress had intended to define nondomestic awards, Congress should have done so in the legislation).
214
Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482.
215
Id. at 481-82.
216
Id. at 482 (emphases added).
217
See, e.g., Rau, supra note 140, at 226 (stating that the interpretation in the Lander case of the
reciprocity reservation is abundantly supported both by history and common sense); see also Trans Chem.,
Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 294 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
218
Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482.
219
Id. (stating that “the statute is comfortably within Congress’s commerce power”).
212
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In determining the scope of § 202, the circuit court read the statute to
exclude only those arbitration awards or agreements arising from a
relationship entirely between U.S. citizens and without any foreign factor.220
The court offered three possible legislative incentives for this interpretation
of § 202: (1) to broaden the scope of the application of the Convention with
the goal of attracting arbitration business to New York; (2) to secure for
American businesses the benefits of judicial enforcement of awards entered
on the basis of reciprocity in the country where the enforcement is sought;
and (3) to simplify procedures governing the foreign activities of American
firms, regardless of the nationality of the parties.221
The court also explored the issue of overlap between the Convention
and the U.S. Convention Act. When a party chooses to enforce a qualified
award under the Convention, the party’s other legal remedies are not
correspondingly eliminated.222 After examining the legislative history of
both the Convention and the Convention Act, the court claimed that it could
not find any suggestion that the Convention is exclusive.223 On the contrary,
Article VII of the Convention provides that it will not “deprive any
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of
the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”224 Therefore,
parties have discretion to choose Article I, § 202, or both, in seeking to
enforce arbitral awards.225
4.

Comments

The Court’s narrow interpretation of the “reciprocity reservation”
significantly alters the application of the Convention.226 The interpretation
220

Id.
See id. (noting that “[w]hatever Congress’s precise thinking on the matter, it spoke clearly [in the
statute itself]”).
222
Id. at 481 ("Article VII of the Convention provides that the Convention shall not ‘deprive any
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the
extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.’”)
223
Id.
224
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. VII; Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481 (“[T]here is ‘no reason to
assume that Congress did not intend to provide overlapping coverage between the Convention and the
Federal Arbitration Act.’”) (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1983)).
225
Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481-82.
226
See Jennifer Dawn Nicholson, Recent Development: Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,
13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 287, 296, 298 (1997) (noting “if the holding in Lander is adopted
universally it could significantly enlarge the number of domestic arbitral awards which will be enforced
under the New York Convention,” and predicting that “[i]ncreased use of the New York Convention may
lead to the greater enforcement of arbitral awards and agreements in the U.S. in terms of international
commerce”).
221
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qualifies many domestically entered awards as Convention awards and
makes it less likely that they will be vacated under the Domestic FAA.227
Under § 208, the Convention Act will prevail over the Domestic FAA in the
enforcement of foreign awards.228 Once characterized as a Convention
award, only seven enumerated grounds in the Convention may be cited for
the denial of enforcement; the scrutiny of the Domestic FAA does not
apply.229 Such a "pro-enforcement" policy for foreign arbitral awards has
been long established in case law.230 If an award is both qualified for
enforcement under the Domestic FAA and the Convention Act, a winning
party is likely to choose the latter as a legal basis.
The Lander rule has been followed by the Fifth Circuit.231 Such a
favorable ruling is certain to make foreign parties feel more comfortable in
seeking legal protection under the Convention rather than being forced to
rely on domestic laws.
Applying the Convention to a broader scope of non-domestic awards
has significant consequences.232 First, it offers independent federal
jurisdiction.233 Second, Convention awardees enjoy a three-year statute of
limitations to initiate proceedings rather than the one-year statute of
limitations under the Domestic FAA.234 Third, the Convention Act allows a
court to compel parties to arbitrate in or outside the United States,235 while
the Domestic FAA limits a court to compelling parties to arbitrate “within
the district.”236 The broader application of the New York Convention will
undoubtedly provide more legal options for American businesses, both
domestically and abroad, and will make the United States more attractive for
arbitration and foreign investment.237

227

Id.
9 U.S.C. § 208.
229
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V.
230
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508
F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974).
231
Trans Chem., Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 294 (S.D. Tex.
1997).
232
See Rau, supra note 140, at 215-17 (detailing the significant impact of the application of the
Convention to an arbitration agreement or an arbitration award).
233
The implementing legislation, the Convention Act, offers independent federal jurisdiction for
arbitration awards or agreements under the Convention. See 9 U.S.C. §203.
234
See Domestic FAA, 9 U.S.C. §9 (providing one-year of statute of limitation for confirming an
award); see also The Convention Act, 9 U.S.C. §207 (providing three-year statute of limitations to confirm
an award under the Convention).
235
9 U.S.C. § 206.
236
9 U.S.C. § 4.
237
See Feldman, supra note 138, at 21.
228
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Jones v. Sea Tow Services: A Drawback on the Territory Criterion

There is little confusion about the territory criterion, requiring that the
Convention shall apply to “arbitral awards made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought.” 238 It is clear that when an award is made in a foreign nation, it
is considered a foreign award in a contracting state and the Convention
applies.239 However, the territory criterion was challenged in a U.S. court as
a result of the ambiguity in the language of § 201 of the U.S. implementation
legislation. Jones v. Sea Tow Services offers a good illustration of the
amplified conflicts between the U.S. domestic legislation and the New York
Convention.240
1.

A Brief Summary of the Case

On a stormy night in 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Jones were on their thirtythree-foot pleasure boat when the boat capsized near the shore. A local
salvage firm named Sea Tow Services was contacted, and its representatives
arrived in a land vehicle. Mr. Jones then signed a Lloyd's Standard Form of
Salvage Agreement, commonly known as LOF, handed over by the captain
of the land vehicle. The LOF contained statements throughout the document
that any disputes under the agreement were subject to arbitration in London,
England, and that English law would apply.
Sea Tow Services’
representatives towed the boat to a marina and sought payment of $15,000
for their services.241 After encountering difficulty collecting, Sea Tow
Services initiated an arbitration proceeding against the Joneses in London.
The Joneses filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York and requested a declaration that the LOF was
unenforceable based on fraud. A stay of the arbitration proceedings
commenced in London. The Joneses argued that the New York Convention
did not apply to the agreement because both parties were American citizens
and the event occurred in U.S. waters. Sea Tow Services responded that the
LOF arbitration clause deprived the court of jurisdiction over the dispute and
that Sea Tow Services was entitled to an order compelling arbitration.242
The District Court ruled that the Convention was applicable and ordered the

238
239
240
241
242

New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).
van den Berg, supra note 125, at 39.
Jones v. Sea Tow Servs., 30 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jones II).
Jones v. Sea Tow Servs., 828 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (Jones I).
Id. at 1006.
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dispute resolved in London per the arbitration clause.243 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and denied the application of the
New York Convention to the dispute.244
2.

The “Foreign Connection” Under Section 202

U.S. courts have developed a four-question formula to determine
whether an agreement or an award qualifies for application of the
Convention under § 202 of the Convention Act.245 The formula requires
affirmative answers to all of the following four questions to secure
application of the Convention: (1) whether there is an agreement in writing
to arbitrate the subject of the dispute; (2) whether the agreement provides for
arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3) whether the
agreement arises out of a legal relationship, contractual or not, which is
considered commercial; and (4) whether a party to the agreement is a foreign
citizen or the relationship involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation to
one or more foreign states.246 Upon reaching affirmative answers to all of
these questions, a court must order arbitration unless it finds the agreement
“null and void.”247 The district court in Jones adopted this four-question
formula and reached affirmative answers to the first three questions.248 After
a careful analysis of, and comparison to, previous decisions, the trial court
ruled that the selection of English law and its designation of London as the
location of arbitration “constitute[s] a reasonable commercial relationship
with the United Kingdom or indicates that the parties envisaged enforcement
abroad.” The Convention was, therefore, applicable to the dispute.249

243

See id. at 1018 (holding that “[P]laintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied insofar as it
requests a declaration that [the Convention] does not apply to the LOF”).
244
Jones II, 30 F.3d at 366.
245
The court cited multiple cases (e.g., Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir.
1982), and Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T Pav Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993)).
246
Jones I, 828 F. Supp. at 1015.
247
Id.; see also Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 959 (10th Cir. 1992);
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982).
248
Jones I, 828 F. Supp. at 1015.
249
In examining the fourth question, the Court recognized that there were previous non-authoritative
cases ruling that LOF connections to a foreign forum and applicable foreign law did not sufficiently
establish the relationship with a foreign nation as provided in § 202. The court refused, however, to follow
this reasoning. See Reinholtz v. Retriever Marine Towing & Salvage, No. CV-92-14141, 1993 WL 414719
(S.D. Fla. May 21, 1993); see also Brier v. Northstar Marine, Inc., No. 91-597(JFG), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20931 (D.N.J. 1992); Jones II, 30 F.3d at 1015-18 (in reaching its conclusion, the court also
analyzed the forum selection, and the policy of construing the Convention broadly so as to effect its
purpose in furthering arbitration agreements on an international scale).

440

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 2

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court. The appellate court found that the designation of London as
the forum for arbitration, and the selection of English law did not satisfy the
requirement of a reasonable foreign connection under § 202.250 Moreover,
the appellate court found that the selection of British law was not
appropriate because no significant portion of the performance occurred or
was to occur in England.251 Furthermore, the Court found that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to compel the arbitration in London since § 206
does not apply to an arbitral agreement outside the scope of the
Convention.252
Isolated from the Convention, both the district and circuit courts
analyzed § 202 on legitimate grounds. However, it seems that both courts
mistakenly targeted § 202 and missed the interplay between § 202 and the
Convention.
3.

Does Section 202 Conflict with the New York Convention?

The adoption of the territory criterion for the application of the
Convention is unconditional among contracting parties.253 The one single
determining element is the location of the arbitral award; a contracting state
should apply the Convention to an award entered in another contracting
state.254 This straightforward rule set forth by the Convention means that
neither the nationality of the parties, the applicable law, the location for
performance, nor the location of agreement executed impacts the application
of the Convention to foreign awards.
It is noteworthy that the Jones case deals with an agreement to
arbitrate in a foreign country rather than with a foreign award. However, by
analogizing to Article I, the Convention should be read as requiring the
enforcement of agreements that would in turn lead to foreign awards or nondomestic awards.255 If a court has a Convention obligation to honor foreign
awards but not to compel parties to arbitrate according to the agreement, the
purpose of the Convention will be substantially undermined. In fact, Article
II of the Convention requires each contracting state to recognize arbitration
250

See Jones II, 30 F.3d at 365-66.
See id. at 366 (analogizing the testimony of an expert, Mr. Kearney, to the U.S. choice of law rule
that “ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the
making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs”).
252
See id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 206 (providing order to compel arbitration and appointment of
arbitrators by a court having jurisdiction).
253
See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I.
254
See id.
255
See Rau, supra note 140, at 233.
251
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agreements in very general terms and without territorial conditions.256 This
understanding is also supported by § 206 of the U.S. Convention Act, which
requires courts to compel arbitration in any place as provided in the
agreement, regardless of whether the location is within the United States.257
In Jones, both the trial and appellate courts reasoned that the foreign
connection criteria in § 202 was intended to restrict the application of the
Convention. The two courts reached different conclusions as to whether the
facts in the case qualified as a foreign connection under § 202. Such an
approach however, was incorrect from the beginning. If § 202 restricts
foreign awards under the Convention, then it conflicts with Article I of the
Convention. Under Article I, enforcing foreign awards from contracting
states is unconditional. Restricting enforcement of foreign awards violates
Convention rules.
There is a reasonable alternative interpretation of § 202 that is
consistent with Article I: the foreign connection condition was intended to
restrict non-domestic awards made in the United States or agreements that
would lead to such non-domestic awards.258 So far, however, U.S. courts
have not taken this approach. Several lower courts have adopted the
reasoning of Jones,259 which is binding authority in the Second Circuit and
influential authority around the country.
Confused by ambiguities unanticipated by the drafters of the
implementing legislation, experts have called for a legislative clarification of
§ 202 and an official definition of international arbitration.260 Legislative
clarification may resolve this issue, but one fundamental problem remains:
the international Convention does not take precedence over domestic
legislation in American courts. Furthermore, a particular court’s incapacity
or unwillingness to understand the purpose and intention of the Convention
undermines its implementation. Although most judges in U.S. courts are
highly qualified, not all of them have an international vision, nor do all

256

See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II.
See 9 U.S.C. § 206.
258
See id. (noting that if the function of § 202 is not to flout the Convention, then it must be
interpreted as defining how far the Convention can be expanded, even as to awards rendered within the
United States).
259
See, e.g., Reinholtz v. Retriever Marine Towing & Salvage, No. CV-92-14141 (S.D. Fla. May 21,
1993); see also Brier v. Northstar Marine, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20931, 1993 A.M.C. 1194 (D.N.J.
1992).
260
See, e.g., Richard W. Hulbert, REPORT: Comment on a Proposed New Statute for International
Arbitration, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 153 (2002).
257
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judges have extensive knowledge of international law.261 Convinced that the
implementing legislation is specifically tailored to better serve U.S. interests,
some judges simply ignore the original provisions in the Convention.
The New York Convention was adopted to provide predictable
procedural and substantive rules for enforcing arbitration awards and
agreements. The standards set to classify Convention agreements or awards
are mandatory rules with which contracting states have an obligation to
comply. A contracting state’s domestic legislation or judicial interpretation
jeopardizing convention provisions is a violation of the Convention. In the
Jones decision, the court went beyond reasonable limitation and created U.S.
case law that is in conflict with the New York Convention. Such an
approach damages the reputation of U.S. courts in enforcing Convention
awards or agreements. U.S. courts should restrain from walking away from
the guidelines set by the international community and uphold the goal of the
Convention Act.262
V.

CHINA’S APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION

A.

Narrow Interpretation of the Territory Reciprocity Reservation

China became a member of the New York Convention on April 22,
1987.263 In its accession document, China declared both a “reciprocity
reservation” and a “commercial reservation.”264 The English version of the
“reciprocity reservation” in China’s declaration copies the language from the
261
See, e.g., Rau, supra note 140, at 229 (using taunting language to criticize the trial court's decision
in Lander for its misinterpretation of the “reciprocity reservation”: “once one starts with a foolish premise,
a foolish conclusion cannot be far behind”).
262
The purposes of the United States' accession to the convention were: (1) to “encourage the
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards;” (2) to relieve the courts of heavy caseloads;
(3) to offer parties an alternative method for resolving disputes, which is “speedier and less costly than
litigation;” (4) to provide American businesses with “a widely used system to obtain domestic enforcement
of international commercial arbitration awards, subject only to minimal standards of domestic judicial
review.” Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Ultracashmere
House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 888
(1995).
263
See Decisions on China’s Accession to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award, adopted by the 18th Meeting of the 6th Session of the Standing Committee of the
NPC on Dec. 2, 1986; see also Notice of the SPC Concerning the Implementation of the Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, issued by the SPC of China on Apr. 10, 1987,
Fa (Jing) Fa [1987] No. 5, SUPREME COURT GAZETTE, June 20, 1987, at 40 [hereinafter SPC Notice
Concerning the Convention].
264
See Decisions on China’s Accession to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award, supra note 263.
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Convention.265 However, the Chinese language version of the declaration
contains a clear limitation that only applies the Convention to awards from
“another” contracting country, other than China. In its implementing notice,
the SPC explicitly emphasized in several places that the reciprocity
reservation confines China’s application of the Convention only to arbitral
awards made “within the territory of another contracting country,” not
including China.266 This tight and clear Chinese language in the declaration
and in the SPC’s notice does not offer any space for an alternative
interpretation such as the one made by the U.S. court in Lander.267 Chinese
courts and scholars have accepted the understanding that the “reciprocity
reservation” is meant to exclude any domestically entered awards, regardless
of their classification under Chinese law; therefore, China’s obligation under
the Convention is limited to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards rendered within the territory of another contracting party, not
including China.268
B.

Non-Domestic Awards in China

1.

The Concept of “Foreign-Related Awards”

In the Chinese legal system, the term “non-domestic award” is not
clearly defined. Instead, the concept of “foreign-related awards” has been
developed for arbitration awards that are entered in the territory of China but
which are not considered to be regular domestic awards under Chinese

265
See U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
NYConvention_status.html (last visited June 1, 2006) (listing the declarations and reservations of various
countries, including China).
266
See SPC Notice Concerning the Convention, supra note 263, art.1.
267
See Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “another
Contracting State” in the reciprocity reservation was intended to mean “another signatory of the
Convention, like the United States, as opposed to non-signatories”); see also New York Convention, supra
note 3, art. I(1).
268
See Xiaowen Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the
United States and China, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 607, 615 (2000) (noting that China foreclosed the
possibility of applying the Convention to arbitral awards entered by CIETAC and CMAC at the time of its
ratification of the Convention by the reservation; further commenting that China’s narrow interpretation
language made in the reservation is allowed by the Convention); see also HANG SONG,
《 国际国国国国国国及国际国际国》 》 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION）
(in Chinese) 243, (2000); JIAN HAN,
《 现代国际国国国国国及最现国现代》 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (in Chinese) 475-6 (rev. ed. 2000) (citing the SPC’s Notice and also trying to define “made
in a territory of another country”).
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law.269 In other words, foreign-related awards in China are the equivalent of
the non-domestic awards defined in the Convention. However, as China
intends to avoid disputes over the “reciprocity reservation,” the Chinese
legislature and the courts do not use the term “non-domestic awards.”
The concept of “foreign-related arbitral awards” first appeared in the
1991 Civil Procedural Law of China.270 However, the law does not offer a
clear definition of foreign-related arbitral awards. Instead, the law stipulates
the substantive procedures for the enforcement of awards entered by a
“foreign-related arbitration institute.”271 The Civil Procedure Law implies
that all awards entered by Chinese foreign-related arbitration institutions are
“foreign-related awards.” Such a mechanism is unusual, but it was practical
before the implementation of the 1994 Arbitration Law, when the Chinese
government authorized only two institutions, CIETAC and CMAC, to have
jurisdiction over foreign-related arbitration.272 After the implementation of
the 1994 Arbitration Law however, local arbitration commissions became
eligible to take foreign-related cases and international arbitration institutes
were eligible to take domestic cases.273 The nature of the institute therefore,
is no longer a critical factor in defining “foreign-related awards.”
In practice, Chinese courts have adopted a new definition of foreignrelated arbitration: arbitration for foreign-related cases.274 The definition of
foreign-related cases has been pronounced in SPC’s legal interpretations.275
According to a 1992 SPC interpretation implementing the 1991 Civil
Procedure Law, a case is a “foreign-related case” if: (1) one or both parties
are foreign nationals, stateless persons, or foreign companies or
organizations; (2) the legal actions leading to formation, change, or

269

See generally XIANGSHU LIU, A JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRAL AWARD SYSTEM OF CHINA (in Chinese) 1-22 (2001) (detailing the concept and definition of
“foreign-related arbitration” in China and pointing out it serves to differentiate domestic arbitration).
270
See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 257-261. Chapter 28, Arbitration (art. 257-261)
was structured under Part Four, Special Stipulations for Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Interest.
271
See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, arts. 258-260; see also The Chinese SPC, Opinions
Regarding to Various Issues Arising From the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of 1991
》 最最最最国最关最《 中华最最中中国最国华华国》 及及问问及规及） , art. 304 (issued July 14, 1992) (Chinese
version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
272
See ZHIDONG CHEN, supra note 47, 65-68.
273
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
274
See JIAN HANG, supra note 268, at 469; see also XIANGSHU LIU, supra note 269, at 11-22 (citing
more related sources as evidence that the rules defining foreign-related arbitration are based on the legal
relationship).
275
See, e.g., Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the General Principles of
Civil Law of People’s Republic of China (trial version), promulgated by SPC on Jan. 26, 1988 and
published on Apr. 2, 1988, art. 178.
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termination of the legal relationship occurred in a foreign country; or, (3) the
subject matter of the dispute is located in a foreign country.276
Although Chinese courts do not apply the New York Convention to
foreign-related arbitral agreements or awards, the Chinese legal system does
offer more favorable treatment to foreign-related arbitral awards than regular
domestic awards. The qualification of a dispute as a “foreign-related
arbitration” therefore, has a significant legal consequence in China.
2.

Special Treatment for Foreign-Related Arbitration

The narrow interpretation of the reciprocity reservation in China
excludes the application of the New York Convention to the recognition and
enforcement of any awards rendered in China. However, China offers
favorable treatment to foreign-related arbitration for the purpose of attracting
foreign business.277 While Western countries have been very suspicious of
the competence and fairness of the Chinese court system, arbitration has
become a primary choice for foreign businesses resolving disputes in China.
In addition, the Chinese government has striven to attract more foreignrelated arbitration cases for Chinese arbitration institutes. As a result, China
adopted a special legal system for foreign-related arbitration, which imitates
the New York Convention.
a.

Grounds for Refusing Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Related Awards

i.

The New York Convention

The core benefit of the Convention is that it limits the ability of courts
to refuse to recognize and enforce arbitral awards; thus, making arbitration
and arbitral awards more authoritative. Article V of the Convention spelled
out five grounds on which a party may invoke a request for a court to deny
276
See Opinions Regarding Various Issues Arising From the Application of the Civil Procedure Law
of 1991, supra note 271, art. 304, issued by the Chinese SPC on July 14, 1992.
277
In fact, not long after Communist China was established, then Primer Minister Zhou En Lai
requested the establishment of an arbitration system and Chinese arbitration institutes. An open door
policy was later established in order to allow foreign business to enter China after the cultural revolution,
but before this policy came into effect, arbitration was the only available dispute resolution forum for
foreign-related business. This was because the Chinese courts were either not functional or did not accept
foreign-related disputes. See Houzhi Tang, The Road of Arbitration: A Commemorating Article for the
50th Anniversary of the China Council for Promotion of International Trade, available at
www.cietac.org.cn (last visited Aug. 2, 2003) (Chinese version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal).
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recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award.278 Those five grounds can
be summarized as follows: (1) incapacity of parties or invalidity of the
agreement; (2) insufficient notice or unfair deprivation of procedural rights;
(3) disputed issues beyond the agreed scope of submission; (4) improper
arbitral procedures or tribunal; and (5) non-binding awards.279 In addition,
the Convention offers enforcing courts the discretionary power to refuse
recognition and enforcement based on either of two grounds: the subject
matter “is not capable of settlement by arbitration,” or the enforcement
would be against public policy.280
ii.

Foreign-Related Awards in China

Article 260 of China’s 1991 Civil Procedure Law offered four
independent legal grounds a defendant may invoke against a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award.281 Those
four criteria are: (1) no written arbitration agreement exists; (2) notice was
insufficient or procedural rights were unfairly deprived; (3) the arbitral
procedure or tribunal was improper; and, (4) the disputed issues were
beyond the agreed upon scope of arbitration or the subject matter was not
capable of settlement by arbitration.282 In addition, Article 260 provides that
Chinese courts may deny the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related
arbitral awards based upon “public interest.”283 The 1994 Arbitration Law
cited above discussed Article 260(1) as grounds for refusing recognition or
enforcement of a foreign-related award.284 For reasons unknown, the
“public interest” ground was not included in the 1994 Arbitration Law. As
Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure Law is still a valid legal source
however, public interest remains a legal basis that a court may cite to refuse
enforcement or recognition of a foreign-related award.
b.

Grounds for Refusing Enforcement of Domestic Awards

Grounds for refusing enforcement of domestic awards are regulated in
article 217(2)-(3) of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law.285 A party may cite the
following reasons to defend a non-enforcement request: (1) no arbitration
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V(1).
Id.
See id. art. V(2).
See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 260.
See id.
See id. art. 260(2).
See 1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, art. 71.
See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 217(2), (3).
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agreement exists; (2) disputed issues are beyond the scope of the agreement
or the arbitral institute is not an authorized one; (3) the arbitral tribunal or
proceeding is improper; (4) major evidence for fact determination is lacking;
(5) there was an error “in the application of the law”; or (6) the arbitrator
was corrupt or “perverted the law”.286 In addition, a court may cite “social
public interest” as grounds for refusing to enforce an award.287
c.

Comparison of the Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement

A close-up comparison reveals that the Chinese law offers more
favorable treatment than the Convention to the recognition and enforcement
of a “foreign-related award.” The grounds a party may invoke for refusing
recognition and enforcement of an award are substantially narrower than
under the Convention. The first ground in Article 260(1) of the Chinese
Civil Procedure Law (no written arbitration agreement exists) is actually
required as a prerequisite for the application of the Convention.288 The first
ground of Article V(1) of the Convention (incapacity of parties or invalidity
of the agreement) and the last ground (non-binding award) are not found in
Chinese law.
Under current Chinese law, parties are offered opportunities to
challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement, based on the incapacity of
a party, either at an arbitration commission or in court at an earlier stage of
the arbitral proceeding.289 If a party does not challenge the validity of the
arbitration agreement before the first hearing of an arbitral proceeding, the
party will be considered to have waived the right and will not be allowed to
raise the issue during the enforcement stage.290 Such a structure increases
the system’s efficiency and avoids procedural abuse at the enforcement stage
by a losing party.
Apparently, judicial review is more stringent for domestic awards than
for foreign-related awards. Chinese courts may review the substantive
issues on domestic awards, such as the evidence and application of the

286

Id.
Id.
288
See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II(1), (2) (requiring arbitration agreement to be in
writing to apply the Convention).
289
See 1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, art. 17 (providing that arbitration agreement entered by
an individual of limited civil capacity or no civil capacity is invalid); see also id. art. 20 (providing that a
party may have the court of arbitral commission determine the validity of arbitration agreement).
290
See id. art. 20(2) (providing that a party should raise the challenge to the validity of the arbitration
agreement prior to the first hearing of the arbitral proceeding).
287
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law.291 It is critical, therefore, that parties ensure that their arbitration is
considered to be a “foreign-related award” in order to limit the scope of
judicial review and the possible defenses.
d.

Public Interest v. Public Policy

The “public interest” defense292 for the enforcement of foreign-related
awards in Chinese law has brought intense criticism. The term “public
interest” is unique in Chinese law, and it is different from “public policy” in
Article V(2)(b) of the Convention or traditional international law. Legal
experts have been striving to reach a universal definition for public policy
but have found “it is difficult, if not impossible” to define the concept.293
However, it is generally agreed that, for the purpose of the Convention,
public policy should be construed narrowly and limited to the violation of a
state’s “international public policy or order public international.”294 U.S.
courts have held that the public policy defense under the Convention applies
only when “enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions
of morality and justice.”295 Widely accepted factors that may be invoked as
violations of international public policy include, but are not limited to:
biased arbitrators, lack of reasons for the award, serious irregularities in the
arbitration procedure, allegations of illegality, corruption or fraud, the award
of punitive damages and the breach of competition law.296
The term “pubic interest” is different from the term "public policy,"
and the former appears to be broader than “basic notions of morality and
291
See id. art. 58 (providing grounds that a court may revoke a domestic arbitral award). Cf. id. art.
70 (providing the grounds that a court may revoke a foreign-related award).
292
See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 260(2).
293
See LEW, supra note 3, at 722-23 (listing definitions offered by courts from different countries).
294
International public policy is different from domestic public policy. French NCPC Articles 1498
and 1502 regulated the international public policy and has been influential around the world. See id. at 721
& n. 173.
295
See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d
969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that allowing the “public policy defense as a parochial device protective of
national political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility” and “national policy” does
not equate to public); see also Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004) (reaching narrow reading of the public policy defense and
finding that “[e]rroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law is generally not a violation of public
policy within the meaning of the New York Convention.”).
296
See LEW, supra note 3, at 722-23. Efforts to unify the definition of public policy were made by
the International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration. A report and a
resolution on public policy as a bar to the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards were published
containing a guideline for the classification of public policy grounds. See ILA Committee on International
Commercial Arbitration, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to the Enforcement of International
Arbitral Awards, in LONDON CONFERENCE REPORT 4-5 (2000) (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal).
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justice.” Public interest may include any financial, cultural, environmental,
or other interest as long as it is public, and not isolated to a small group.297
Technically, any enforcement may have a substantial impact on the financial
situation of an interest group, and the public interest defense may therefore
be abused as a ground for defending arbitral awards. This wide-open ground
offered a convenient channel for local protectionists in China.298
The concern is more than a hypothetical discussion; rather it has
become a real threat: a Chinese court refused to enforce a CIETAC foreignrelated award on pubic interest grounds because the court believed that
enforcement would severely impact the national economy, damage social
pubic interest, and impact the nation’s foreign trade order.299 Although the
decision was eventually reversed by the SPC, the SPC ruling addressed only
the particular situation in the case and did not offer a general definition of
“public interest.”300 Although the 1994 Arbitration Law does not include
pubic interest as a ground that a court can cite to deny enforcement of a
foreign-related award, the law does not overwrite the pubic interest grounds
provided in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law. Public interest, therefore,
remains a legal ground that courts may cite to refuse an enforcement
request.301
3.

Reporting System for Foreign-Related Awards and Convention Awards

In many respects, China has attempted to treat foreign-related awards
as quasi-Convention awards. To promote international arbitration, China has
offered foreign-related arbitration treatment that is more favorable than
treatment under the New York Convention. Exercising its implementing
power, the SPC established a reporting/approval system for both foreignrelated arbitral awards and foreign arbitral awards (including Convention
Awards).302 The reporting system requires that a lower court’s decision
297

See HU LI, 《 国际国国国国国国及强国际国:特别特及国国国国特中国及强国际国》 [ENFORCEMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE ARBITRAL AWARD IN THE P. R. CHINA] 148 (2000) (citing the violation of sovereignty, damage to
natural resources, serious contamination to the environment, threat to public health or safety, or corruption
of morality as possible violations of social public interest and resulting in the refusal of enforcing an
arbitral award).
298
See id. at 148 (citing Kaifen Dongfeng Clothing Factory v. Henan Clothing Import & Export
(Group) Co.).
299
Id.
300
See id. The case was also reported in Michael J. Moser, China and the Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, 61 ARB. 50-51 (1995).
301
1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 260(2).
302
See [SPC], Notice of the SPC Concerning the Handling of Foreign-Related Arbitration and
Foreign Arbitration, (Aug. 28, 1995) (Chinese version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
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denying enforcement of a foreign-related award or a foreign award must be
approved by the SPC.303 In detail, an IPC must report to an appropriate HPC
for approval when the IPC intends to refuse enforcement of a foreign-related
award or a foreign award.304 If the HPC agrees with the lower court’s
refusal opinion, the HPC must report to the SPC for a final review and
approval. The IPC cannot enter a decision to refuse enforcement unless and
until the SPC approves the opinion.305
Though the reporting system has been criticized for its ineffective
procedure and limited application,306 the new system clearly reflects the
SPC’s positive attitude towards foreign-related arbitration: a standard that is
equal to or more favorable than the Convention.
C.

Foreign Invested Companies and the Convention

1.

Legal Status of Foreign Invested Companies in China

The majority of foreign direct investments (“FDI”) in China are in the
form of joint venture companies (“JVCs”) or wholly foreign owned
enterprise (“WFOE”) companies, both of which are considered to be entities
of Chinese nationality according to Chinese law.307 A JVC or a WFOE is not
considered a foreign party in litigation; thus, the case is not considered a
foreign-related case if no other independent foreign factors are involved.308
Therefore, disputes between two foreign invested companies or between a

303

Id.
See id. In China, IPCs are the courts of jurisdiction for enforcing foreign-related awards and
intermediate courts are the courts of jurisdiction for enforcing Convention awards or other foreign awards
in China. See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 258, 269.
305
See Notice of SPC Concerning the Handling of Foreign Awards, supra note 302.
306
See Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards in the People’s Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 12, 28-30 (2000) (reporting that the
SPC "denied 80% of the requests to refuse enforcement" and criticizing the system’s exclusion of foreign
ad hoc arbitration, the lack of a procedure to supervise non-reported but not enforced cases, and limited
application to foreign invested companies).
307
See Regulations for the Implementation of the Equity Joint Venture Law of the People's Republic
of China, promulgated by the State Council on Sept. 20, 1983. Article 100 was amended by the State
Council on January 15, 1986, 1 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS.: BUS. REG. ¶ 6-550 (CCH), art. 2; see also
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Fourth Session
of the Sixth NPC and promulgated by the President of China on Apr. 12, 1986, 2 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN
BUS.: BUS. REG. ¶ 13-506 (CCH), art. 8; Company Law of PRC, art. 18; General Principles of Civil Law of
People’s Republic of China (also known as Civil Principle Code of People’s Republic China) (adopted by
Fourth Session of the Sixth People’s Congress of China on Apr. 2, 1986 and published on Apr. 12, 1986 by
the No. 37 President Order with effective date set on Jan. 1, 1987) art. 37, 41(2), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited February, 18 2006)
308
See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
304
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foreign invested company and a Chinese domestic company, without other
foreign connections, are considered domestic cases.
2.

Foreign Investment Companies in Arbitration Proceedings

In terms of arbitration, Chinese courts follow the “company’s
nationality rule”: a JVC or a WFOE is not considered a foreign party but a
Chinese company; arbitration involving JVCs or WFOEs, if no other
qualified foreign connection exists, will not be considered foreign-related.309
In a widely cited 1992 enforcement case, China International Engineering v.
Lido, the Beijing IPC ruled that a JVC established under Chinese law was a
Chinese legal entity and the fact that the JVC was a party in an arbitration
proceeding did not qualify the case as “foreign-related.”310 The court found
that the parties in Lido were both legal Chinese entities and no other foreign
element was involved. The court further determined that CIETAC, which
then only handled foreign arbitration cases, did not have jurisdiction over
any domestic cases and thus refused to enforce the CIETAC award.311
Though entirely controlled by foreign investors, WFOEs, like JVCs,
are not considered foreign legal parties in Chinese arbitration proceedings.
In 2001, Beijing No. 2 IPC ruled in Amcor v. China that a dispute involving
a WFOE and a Chinese domestic company did not qualify as foreign-related
arbitration.312 In Amcor, the WFOE (Amcor) challenged the Beijing
Arbitration Commission’s award on the ground that the commission failed to
apply foreign-related procedure to the arbitration.313 The Court found that
309
China Int’l Eng’g Consultancy Co. v. Lido Hotel of Beijing (1992, Beijing Intermediate People’s
Court). The case was to enforce a CIETAC arbitral award against Lido Hotel, a joint venture company
invested by a Hong Kong company and a Chinese company. The Lido case triggered the CIETAC to
amend its arbitration rules in 1998 to expand its jurisdiction to cover foreign joint venture disputes, even
when the foreign joint venture is a Chinese legal person. Reported and recited in Hu Li, supra note 297, at
146-47; see also MO, supra note 58, at 59-60; Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical
Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280 (2001) (discussing the
Lido case and its impact).
310
HU LI, supra note 297, at 146-147.
311
See id. at 147; see also 1988 Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (Chinese version on file with Pacific
Rim Law & Policy Journal).
312
Amcor Flexible Packing (Beijing) Co. (安安安软安安安安安安安安) v. China No. 22nd Metallurgy
Constr. Co. (中国中中中中中中中设安安) (Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court Civil Order, docket No. (2001)
Erzhongjinzhongzi No. 1640), available at http://www.bjac.org.cn (last visited on Nov. 9, 2003).
313
Amcor challenged on the grounds that Amcor is a foreign invested company and contains a
foreign element, and so the dispute should be arbitrated by qualified arbitrators for foreign-related cases
and not by a general arbitrator. See id. The Beijing Arbitration Commission maintains different lists of
arbitrators for domestic disputes and foreign-related disputes. For foreign-related cases, the commission
should deliver a list of eligible arbitrators to the parties. The 1999 version is applicable to Amcor. See
Beijing Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (1999 Version), art. 72, available at
http://www.bjac.org.cn (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).

452

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 2

Amcor was a Chinese legal entity and the arbitration proceeding did not
qualify as a foreign-related arbitration. Thus, the arbitration tribunal’s
application of domestic procedure complied with the 1994 Arbitration Law
and the Procedure Rules of the Beijing Arbitration Commission.314
3.

Criticism and Comment

Preventing foreign invested companies from applying favorable
foreign-related arbitration procedures and rules exposes foreign investors to
risk. Domestic arbitration awards in China are subject to stricter scrutiny
and broader review in the courts. When foreign investors choose arbitration
with the intention of skipping the uncertainty of Chinese courts, excluding
foreign invested companies from applying foreign-related rules and laws
upsets the foreign investors’ major goal. This drawback discounts the value
of arbitration to foreign investors in China and disables a dispute resolution
channel that is valuable to foreign business. The drawback will not only
negatively impact the investment environment in China, but will also paint
China in a less favorable light for the purpose of international arbitration.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Case studies and theoretical analyses demonstrate that intervention
from domestic courts has significantly impacted the application of the New
York Convention. While appropriate and positive intervention promotes
arbitration and international business, inappropriate court intervention
damages international arbitration, and in turn, negatively impacts
international business. Striking an appropriate balance of intervention in
international arbitration is a challenging task for domestic courts. In
offering universal rules for domestic courts, the New York Convention has
achieved unprecedented success. However, achieving the goals set by the
Convention depends heavily on the implementation process in domestic
courts. As a result of the ambiguity of the original Convention language and
the variation between domestic implementation systems and judicial
discretion, achievement of a universal application of the New York
Convention is far from a reality.
Studies have shown that domestic courts could effectively diminish or
expand the benefits of the New York Convention by strategically limiting or
expanding the scope of its application. Though originally purporting to
implement a set of universal rules, the New York Convention leaves
314

See Notice of SPC Concerning the Handling of Foreign Awards, supra note 302, art. 1.
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contracting states with broad discretion over domestic implementation
procedures. The substantive standards and legal grounds set in the
Convention are clear, and there is little room for domestic courts to exercise
interpretation.
However, domestic courts have broad discretion in
determining the application and scope of the Convention.
In general, the discretion of local courts can be classified into two
categories: macro, and micro level discretion. At the macro level, domestic
courts interpret reciprocal rules, Convention wording, and domestic
implementation rules. Examples of decisions from courts with macro
discretion are the U.S. court’s ruling in Lander and the Chinese SPC’s
exclusion of non-domestic awards category from the application of New
York Convention. At the micro level, individual courts may use a single
factor to distort legislative intention, as illustrated in Jones.
Theoretically, U.S. courts have greater discretion at the micro level on
the application and scope of the Convention than do Chinese courts. This is
because the New York Convention does not apply directly in U.S. courts but
through domestic legislation. The domestic implementation legislation, the
Convention Act, takes a different approach than the Convention to classify
qualified awards, leaving domestic courts room to manipulate ambiguous
language in the legislation. In addition, U.S. courts that maintain high levels
of judicial independence have some ability to formulate their own rules on
certain issues. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court is generally
reluctant to unify international treaty issues involving interests of different
domestic private groups.
Unlike the law in the United States, in China, international
conventions are directly applicable and are superior to any conflicting
domestic laws or regulations. In addition, the Chinese SPC has frequently
offered judicial interpretations, applicable in all courts nationwide,
concerning the New York Convention. Furthermore, the Chinese SPC has
established a pre-approval system that requires any denial of the application
of the New York Convention to be reviewed by the SPC.
In general, the U.S. Congress and courts have been in favor of
international arbitration. For example, the U.S. Convention Act has been
largely considered an instrument aimed at promoting international
arbitration agreements and awards. The detailed implementation of the New
York Convention in the United States however, is discounted by
inappropriate judicial intervention. Amplified by Jones, the ambiguity of the
U.S. domestic legislation further complicates courts’ implementation of the
New York Convention. Additionally, an individual court’s misinterpretation

454

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 2

of § 202 seriously jeopardizes the predictability of the application of the
Convention.
To improve predictability and comply with the Convention obligation,
two immediate remedial options are available to the United States. First,
Congress could pass clarifying legislation on § 202 that clearly states that
the foreign connection requirement limits only non-domestic awards, and
that the Convention is applicable to any award entered in the territory of a
foreign contracting state. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could grant
certiorari on a case in order to overrule Jones and clarify that § 202 is
consistent with the New York Convention.
New, clarifying legislation is the most practical option because a U.S.
Supreme Court ruling on the issue is unlikely unless there is a significant
change in the economy, such as surge of international disputes in the United
States. Of course, individual circuit courts may take initiative to abandon
the Jones rule, but it would be hard to reach a national consensus in this way.
There is little doubt that the Chinese judicial commitment to
implement the New York Convention is strong, especially in the SPC and the
HPCs.
The SPC’s active intervention on international commercial
arbitration however, has not always been positive. Several judicial
interpretations have significantly impacted international commercial
arbitration in a negative manner. For example, the SPC does not consider
foreign invested companies in China to be foreign actors in arbitration cases
and they are therefore treated as domestic companies in such proceedings.
U.S. businesses have been very concerned with this issue.315 If foreign
invested companies are treated as domestic companies in arbitration
proceedings, arbitration in China will lose most of its value to foreign
invested enterprises. Domestic arbitral awards are subject to the Chinese
courts’ substantive review during enforcement. Even worse, in the most
recently published draft version of the 2003 SPC Provisions, the SPC
attempted to prohibit domestically incorporated companies (including
foreign invested companies) from arbitrating abroad without a foreignrelated factor.316 Thus, foreign invested enterprises may be denied access to
the New York Convention through arbitration in a foreign country.317
To solve this issue, the Chinese SPC should reclassify foreign
invested companies as foreign companies, rather than as domestic
315
See American Chamber of Commerce-China, Chinese Version [Commentary on the Draft SPC
Provisions on Handling by People’s Court of Foreign-Related Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated
Abroad], available at www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last visited May 15, 2006).
316
See 2003 SPC Provisions (draft), supra note 62, art. 20.
317
See American Chamber of Commerce-China, supra note 315, art. 27 (comments).
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companies, using its power of judicial interpretation. Such special treatment
would not offer foreign invested companies a more favored position than
domestic companies, because foreign businesses are disadvantaged in
accessing unfamiliar Chinese domestic rules. In addition, such special
treatment is necessary because the Chinese SPC has excluded domestically
entered awards from the application of the New York Convention.
Finally, the Chinese legislature should amend and unify its rules for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related awards. The current
discrepancies between the Civil Procedure Law and the 1994 Arbitration
Law, and between Chinese rules and the Convention standards, cause
unnecessary complication and yield no significant benefit. Comparative
analyses have shown that the standards set for recognition and enforcement
of foreign-related awards in China do not substantively differ from the rules
of the New York Convention. The only issue of significance is the special
term of “public interest” in Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure Law, which
is considered to be different from the term “public policy” in the
Convention. However, the later enacted 1994 Arbitration Law has
abandoned the “public interest” provision. Though the 1994 Arbitration
Law does not necessarily invalidate Article 260(2), it is clearly indicative of
legislative intention. It is time therefore, for the Chinese legislature to
amend Article 260 in order to fully incorporate the New York Convention’s
standards.

